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PRIVACY'S PROBLEM AND THE LAW OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
William J. Stuntz* 
Almost all talk about the law of criminal procedure begins with 
two assumptions. The first concerns what that law is about. 
Although the constitutional doctrines that regulate the police pro-
tect a number of values or interests, one - privacy - tops the list. 
The cases and literature on search and seizure, and to a lesser ex-
tent on self-incrimination, routinely emphasize the individual's abil-
ity to keep some portion of his life secret, at least from the 
government. That is why Fourth Amendment cases talk about 
whether evidence is in plain view (and hence no longer hidden from 
the world1) and whether particular places tend to be the locus of 
activities that most people like to keep secret.2 That is also why 
Fifth Amendment cases talk about the defendant's interest in decid-
ing for himself whether to reveal incriminating information; a major 
underpinning of this "right to choose" is the defendant's interest in 
keeping the information to himself.3 Privacy language and privacy 
arguments are rampant in criminal procedure.4 
The second assumption usually goes unspoken: criminal proce-
dure, we all suppose, is a self-contained system. It has little or noth-
ing to do with the rest of constitutional law. Constitutional law 
courses ignore Fourth and Fifth Amendment doctrine, and criminal 
procedure courses return the compliment; the literatures of crimi-
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia. I thank Akhil Amar, Lillian Be Vier, Donald 
Dripps, John Harrison, John Jeffries, Yale Kamisar, Nancy King, Michael Klarman, Larry 
Kramer, Harold Krent, Debra Livingston, Glen Robinson, and Rip Verkerke for helpful 
comments on earlier drafts. Special thanks are due to Louis Michael Seidman, who gave me 
detailed comments on an earlier draft before either of us knew he would be responding to 
this article in print, thereby allowing me to incorporate a number of his suggestions. I also 
thank the participants in workshops at the University of Virginia and Vanderbilt Law Schools 
for many useful criticisms and suggestions, Erik Lillquist and John Nalbandian for research 
assistance, and the SOHIO Research Fellowship for financial support. 
1. The examples are endless, but for two especially revealing ones, see New York v. Class, 
475 U.S. 106 (1986), and United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
2. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
3. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 588-89 (1990); California v. Byers, 402 
U.S. 424, 450-51 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
4. This focus is usually taken for granted, but not always. For a rare and interesting criti-
cism, see Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"'s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Be-
tween Government and Citizen?, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1751 (1994). 
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nal procedure and constitutional law do not speak to one another,s 
and the cases do not cite each other. There is a lot to argue about 
in Fourth and Fifth Amendment law, but the arguments seem to 
have no effect on debates about the scope of the government's 
power outside traditionally criminal areas. 
These two assumptions cannot stand together. It seems easy 
and natural to say that we need to protect the individual's interest 
in keeping some things secret, or at least away from the govern-
ment's prying eyes, when we regulate the police. Privacy is a com-
fortable starting point for Fourth and Fifth Amendment law. Yet 
much of what the modem state does outside of ordinary criminal 
investigation intrudes on privacy just as much as the kinds of police 
conduct that Fourth and Fifth Amendment law forbid. A privacy 
value robust enough to restrain the police should also prevent a 
great deal of government activity that we take for granted - activ-
ity that, at least since the New Deal, is unquestionably 
constitutional. 
To put it differently, a substantive problem lies at the heart of 
criminal procedure: the law is grounded on the protection of a par-
ticular value, privacy, that implies aggressive substantive judicial re-
view of a sort that we have not allowed for the past half-century. 
Privacy, at least as the word is used in criminal procedure, protects 
the interest in keeping information out of the government's hands, 
and information is necessary to both criminal law enforcement 
(where aggressive constitutional law is thought to be good) and or-
dinary regulation (where it is mostly thought to be bad). Criminal 
procedure, or at least privacy-based criminal procedure, thus has a 
good deal more substantive bite than we tend to suppose, and its 
substantive implications push in some uncomfortable directions. 
This problem casts light on a number of features of criminal pro-
cedure, both past and present. The idea that the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments guarantee broad privacy protection dates back at 
least to Boyd v. United States, 6 an 1886 Supreme Court decision that 
5. There are exceptions. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 
100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALL. REv. 
673 (1992); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Con-
stitutional Theory, 11 GEo. LJ. 19 (1988). 
6. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Actually, the link between privacy and the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments predates Boyd; indeed, Boyd itself relies heavily on eighteenth-century ante-
cedents to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. See 116 U.S. at 624-32. But Boyd solidified 
the link, and it provides a useful starting point from which to assess more contemporary 
developments. 
The statement in the text should perhaps be qualified in another respect as well: Boyd's 
conception of privacy protection was very much tied to the protection of property rights. See, 
e.g., Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the 
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laid the foundation for modern search and seizure and self-incrimi-
nation doctrine. To modern ears, Boyd sounds like an odd case to 
lay that foundation: it was a civil forfeiture action arising out of a 
tax dispute.7 And Boyd was not unusual in this respect. Case law 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is filled with 
regulatory disputes - antitrust cases, railroad regulation cases, and 
the like - in which litigants used the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments as shields against government oversight.8 Yet this civil use of 
criminal procedure may not be so odd after all. Boyd's broad pri-
vacy protection arose around the same time that substantive due 
process took flight; the substantive implications of Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment privacy protection may not have seemed as troubling a 
century ago as they do today. The limits the Court later placed on 
Boyd's protection may have a great deal to do with changes in the 
Court's view of those substantive implications. 
Broad restraints on government power are more problematic to-
day. Current Fourth and Fifth Amendment law seems to deal with 
the problem through a series of special rules or exceptions, doc-
trines that treat some privacy intrusions as if they just don't count. 
"Regulatory search" cases allow government searches of businesses 
\vith little or no suspicion of misconduct,9 giving the government 
much more leeway when enforcing fairly trivial regulations than it 
has when enforcing laws against rape or murder. "Required 
records" cases allow the government to compel concededly inci:imi-
nating disclosures via civil regulatory statutes;10 once again this doc-
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HAR.v. L. REv. 945, 951-56 (1977). The temptation is to 
focus on the property aspect of Boyd and ignore privacy. That would be a mistake. Privacy 
and property are fused in Boyd; that is, property seems to be protected as a means of protect-
ing what the Boyd Court called "the privacies of life." 116 U.S. at 630. It is appropriate, 
therefore, to treat Boyd as the foundation for contemporary criminal procedure doctrines 
that aim to protect privacy. 
7. The dispute in Boyd involved shipments of plate glass for use in the construction of a 
post office building in Philadelphia. Boyd was accused of misrepresenting the amount of 
glass on which he had received an exemption from import duties. The government subpoe-
naed customs invoices to prove the misrepresentation, and Boyd objected to the subpoena. 
See Brief for Plaintiffs at 1-5, Boyd (No. 983); Brief for the United States at 1-2. Both briefs 
are reprinted in 8 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND AROUMEN'IS OF nm SUPREME COURT OF nm 
UNITED STATES: CoNSTITUI10NAL LAw (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). 
8. See infra notes 114-124 and accompanying text. 
9. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (upholding a suspicionless search of 
an automobile junkyard). 
10. See, e.g., Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841 
(1984) (upholding a requirement that college students register for the draft in order to apply 
for student loans, notwithstanding that registration might require admitting earlier criminal 
nonregistration); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) (upholding a subpoena requiring 
a wholesaler to tum over various business records that government regulation required him 
to keep, notwithstanding the fact that those records were then used against the wholesaler in 
a criminal prosecution). 
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trine gives the government greater power when enforcing run-of-
the-mill regulations than when investigating serious crime. Finally, 
the "reasonable expectation of privacy" doctrine permits police of-
ficers to uncover the details of a suspect's finances11 or phone 
calls, 12 even though the same doctrine reaffirms and constitution-
ally protects the privacy of lunch bags,13 cigarette packets,14 and the 
underside of stereos.15 No plausible balancing of government need 
against individual privacy interests can explain these results. In-
stead, they are best understood as the inevitable consequence of the 
conflict between privacy-based criminal procedure and the constitu-
tional revolution of the 1930s. In light of that conflict, it is hard to 
see which side in these disputes is "liberal" and which is "conserva-
tive": broader protection of privacy (the supposedly liberal stance) 
is the road back to the Four Horsemen, while reduced privacy pro-
tection (the "conservative" view) guards the integrity of the 1937 
revolution. 
There are two ways to resolve the tension. The system could 
protect privacy consistently, across the board. But that course 
would entail serious costs to the constitutional order under which 
we have lived since the New Deal: tax forms, OSHA inspections, 
routine government employment practices, and a host of other 
things would be constitutionally suspect. The other alternative is to 
reorient criminal procedure, to focus the law less on privacy and 
more on what makes the police different from, and more threaten-
ing than, the government in its other guises. That task is already 
underway, though it is mostly implicit. It needs to proceed further, 
and more candidly. 
11. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that a government request 
that a bank tum over copies of an individual's deposit slips and checks is not a Fourth 
Amendment search). The Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1982), 
imposes some restrictions, but they are fairly gentle: law enforcement officers are not bound 
to show probable cause or even reasonable suspicion as a precondition of obtaining records 
of such things as bank deposits and withdrawals. 
12. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that installation and use of a 
"pen register," which records numbers called by a telephone, is not a Fourth Amendment 
"search"). 
13. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (holding that law enforcement officers 
must have probable cause, though not a warrant, before searching a paper lunch bag found in 
the trunk of the defendant's car). 
14. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (upholding the search of a crum-
pled cigarette packet incident to the defendant's arrest). Robinson held that the search of 
the cigarette packet was permissible as long as the arrest was permissible. 414 U.S. at 236. 
Nowhere did the Court suggest that opening the cigarette packet was anything other than a 
Fourth Amendment "search." But cf. 414 U.S. at 237 (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that 
an arrestee "retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person"). 
15. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987); see also infra notes 24-25 and accompany-
ing text. · 
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Part I of this article addresses the connection between privacy-
based limits on police authority and substantive limits on govern-
ment power as a general matter. Part II briefly addresses the ef-
fects of that connection on Fourth and Fifth Amendment law, both 
past and present. Part ID suggests that privacy protection has a 
deeper problem: it tends to obscure more serious harms that attend 
police misconduct, harms that flow not from information disclosure 
but from the police use of force. The upshot is that criminal proce-
dure would be better off with less attention to privacy, at least as 
privacy is defined in the doctrine today. Were the law of criminal 
procedure to focus more on force and coercion and less on informa-
tion gathering (a change that is already beginning to happen), it 
would square better with other constitutional law and better protect 
the interests most people value most highly. 
I. PRIVACY, POLICE INVESTIGATION, AND SUBSTANTIVE 
RESTRAINT ON GOVERNMENT POWER 
Criminal procedure is about, as the name says, procedure. One 
can read widely in the cases and literature without uncovering any 
indication that restraints on police practices have important sub-
stantive effects. Of course, they do. At a broad level, this observa-
tion is trite: all procedural rules have substantive effects. But it is 
useful to see how criminal procedure casts its substantive shadow, 
and how the size and shape of that shadow depends on the interests 
the law chooses to protect. 
A. Defining Privacy 
To understand the implications of privacy-based criminal proce-
dure one must start with some conception of privacy. That turns 
out to be a problem, for the term means too much. In legal dis-
course privacy encompasses, among other things, the ability to en-
gage in certain conduct free from government regulation,16 freedom 
from being stared at or stalked or "singled out" in public,17 the 
"right to be let alone,"18 and the ability to keep certain information 
16. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
17. See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE LJ. 421, 432-33 
(1980). The tort law equivalent is the claim based on intrusion upon seclusion. See REsTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1965). 
18. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. a (1965); Tracey Maclin, The Decline of 
the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 15 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 
1335 (1990). 
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or aspects of one's life secret.19 If one takes privacy to mean all 
these things, or some fuzzy and varying combination of them, it 
quickly becomes impossible to say anything useful on the subject. 
All outcomes make sense on some combination of privacy interests, 
particularly when one balances them against an equally ill-defined 
sense of government need.20 . 
A more refined definition is needed. In the law of criminal pro-
cedure, two kinds of privacy seem to matter. The first is fairly defi-
nite: privacy interests as interests in keeping information and 
activities secret from the government. The focus here is on what 
government officials can see and hear, what they can find out. The 
paradigmatic infringement of this kind of privacy is the act of read-
ing someone's correspondence or listening to her telephone conver-
sations, or perhaps rummaging through her bedroom closet. The 
second kind of privacy is much harder to get one's hands on: it is 
easier to say what it is not than what it is. It is not, other than 
coincidentally, about protecting secrets and information. Rather, it 
1 
is about preventing invasions of dignitary interests, as when a police 
officer publicly accosts someone and treats him as a suspect. Ar-
rests or street stops infringe privacy in this sense because they stig-
matize the individual, single him out, and deprive him of freedom. 
Both sorts of privacy are protected in criminal procedure: 
Fourth Amendment law regulates both wiretaps and arrests. And· 
the two often go together: house searches, the heart of Fourth 
Amendment concern, involve both types of injury. But the inter-
ests are neither equally important to the law nor equally well pro-
tected. On the contrary, informational privacy - privacy as 
nondisclosure - is and has been preeminent. When courts decide 
whether a given police tactic infringed a "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" and hence whether the tactic is a "search" subject to 
Fourth Amendment regulation, they ask whether the police saw or 
heard something that any member of the public might have seen or 
heard in a similar manner.21 The question, in other words, is 
whether what the police did was likely to capture something secret. 
19. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
20. The problem is especially hard if these various meanings hang together in some sense. 
For an argument that they do, see Gavison, supra note 17. 
21. E.g., Ciraolo v. California, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (upholding an overflight of a 
private home against a Fourth Amendment challenge, and noting that "[a]ny member of the 
public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers 
observed"); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (upholding the electronic 
tracking of the movements of defendant's automobile against a Fourth Amendment chal-
lenge, and noting that "[w]hen [defendant] traveled over the public streets he voluntarily 
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular roads 
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The reasoning of the cases is far from consistent; neither this norm 
nor any other can fully explain the doctrine. Nevertheless, privacy-
as-secrecy dominates the case law.22 
Two examples should suffice to make the point. The concept of 
"plain view" - the idea that the police are not subject to any 
Fourth Amendment constraint when they see something from a 
vantage point they are entitled to take (sometimes because any 
member of the public is entitled to the same vantage point) - is 
the centerpiece of search law. This concept basically defines what is 
a "search,"23 and hence defines what police conduct the Fourth 
Amendment regulates and what conduct it leaves alone. With re-
spect to things that are searches, the plain view concept determines 
what must be separately justified. In short, it determines in an 
enormous number of cases whether the Fourth Amendment has or 
has not been obeyed. The concept makes sense only in terms of 
'informational privacy. It flows out of the interest in keeping 
secrets, not out of the interest in being free from unreasonable po-
lice coercion or from other kinds of dignitary harms that search 
targets may suffer. 
Consider some examples of how the plain view concept is ap-
plied. In Arizona v. Hicks,24 police officers legally entered an 
apartment to investigate a shooting. Once inside, one of the of-
ficers noticed a pair of expensive-looking stereos; he turned over 
the turntables in order to copy down the serial numbers. The ste-
reos turned out to be stolen. The Supreme Court found that look-
ing at the underside of the turntables was a separate Fourth 
Amendment "search" that needed to be separately justified; be-
cause the officer did not have probable cause to believe that the 
stereos were stolen before looking at the serial numbers, this 
in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destina-
tion when he exited from public roads onto private property"). 
22. For one acknowledgment of the point, see RICHARD C. TURKINGTON ET AL., Pru. 
VACY: CASES AND MATERIALS (1992). This recently published casebook on privacy in the 
law places search and seizure doctrine in a chapter on "Informational Privacy," rather than in 
chapters on "Privacy Protection for Personality, Identity and Reputation" or "Privacy and 
Autonomy." 
23. See supra note 21. I am using plain view in its conceptual sense, not in its doctrinal 
sense. Doctrinally, plain view refers to an exception to the warrant requirement for seizures 
of evidence discovered during an otherwise legitimate encounter or search. The concept of 
plain view is broader: the idea is that whenever the police see something from a vantage 
point they are entitled to have, what they see is fair game. This idea is central not only to the 
plain view exception to the warrant requirement but also to the determination of what a 
"search" is to begin with. 
24. 480 U.S. 321 (1987). 
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"search" was illegal.25 On the other -hand, in United States v. 
I\;JJ&Jts,.26 the Court held that police stalking of suspects, as long as it 
is done in public, receives no Fourth Amendment regulation at all. 
The theory is that an officer is entitled to see anything, including 
movements on public streets and in public places, that any member 
of the public could see from a similar series of vantage points.21 
These results do not make sense on any definition of privacy that 
focuses on the interest in being "let alone" or on protecting against 
dignitary harm. Given that approach, what happened in Hicks 
would not be worth worrying about: turning over the stereo caused 
no real dignitary harm. In dignitary terms the only issue would be 
the legality of the search of the apartment in general. But if the law 
seeks to protect informational privacy, each marginal search, each 
additional place where the officer casts his eye, represents a sepa-
rate issue and ought to be separately justified.28 The point holds 
true for Knotts as well. In dignitary terms Knotts seems plainly 
wrong, but in informational privacy terms it is at least plausible. 
The same pattern appears in the relationship between the 
Fourth Amendment's regulation of searches and its regulation of 
seizures. Seizures, unlike searches, have no logical connection to 
informational privacy: seizures are deprivations of property or lib-
erty interests, not disclosures of things the suspect may wish to keep 
secret. But both searches and seizures are expressly protected by 
the Fourth Amendment. It follows that the Fourth Amendment 
must protect something besides privacy-as-secrecy. Yet, as anyone 
familiar with Fourth Amendment doctrine knows, seizures are far 
less heavily regulated than searches. A police officer can grab me, 
spin me around, force me to spread my arms and legs against the 
wall, and frisk me, all in public view, based on a "reasonable suspi-
cion" - say, a one-in-four chance - that I may have committed a 
crime.29 The same officer cannot open the trunk of my car without . 
25. 480 U.S. at 323-29. 
26. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
27. 460 U.S. at 281-83. 
28. Actually, the test appears to be not where the officer casts his eye but where he puts 
his hand. In Hicks, the Court emphasized that the officer had moved the stereo in order to 
see the serial number. 480 U.S. at 324-25. 
29. The reasonable suspicion test comes from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-27 (1968). 
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227-29 (1985), established that Terry's standard may 
be satisfied by reasonable suspicion of an already completed crime. As for the "one-in-four 
chance" language, that is my own extrapolation. The Supreme Court refuses to provide any 
formulation other than a negative one: reasonable suspicion requires "considerably less than 
proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence." United States v. Sokolow, 490 
U.S. 1, 7 (1989). Professor LaFave's treatise says that the requirement is a "substantial possi-
1024 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 93:1016 
probable cause3o - a significantly tougher standard. So too, sus-
pects may be arrested and imprisoned for up to forty-eight hours 
without the approval of a judicial officer and without a showing that 
getting such approval would have been terribly hard.31 But an of-
ficer cannot cross the threshold of my house without a warrant un-
less getting one was practically impossible.32 
These lines show the degree to which the doctrine has been 
dominated by the desire to protect individuals' interest in keeping 
some parts of their lives secret, and the degree to which that value 
has traditionally overshadowed all others in Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence. Police-citizen encounters are intrusive, often trauma-
tizing, in many ways and for· many reasons. But the law seems to 
focus relentlessly on the harm caused by seeing or hearing some-
thing. That is what privacy usually means in criminal procedure. 
The strength of the informational privacy interest in Fifth 
Amendment law is less obvious and less strong. It is hard to explain 
the basic structure of self-incrimination doctrine in informational 
privacy terms: the privilege does not apply to physical evidence, 
which can be at least as "private" as testimony,33 and it does not 
protect immunized testimony, no matter how "private" in the ordi-
nary sense of that word.34 Yet the privilege is still bedeviled by the 
effort to articulate just what the relevant interest is. Why it is that a 
defendant need not answer possibly incriminating questions?3S A 
bility" of crime. 3 WAYNER. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ 9.3(b), at 431-32 (2d ed. 
1987). 
30. Under Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), officers may sometimes perform a 
quick search of the passenger compartment of a car based on reasonable suspicion that weap-
ons might be present. But such a "car frisk" does not include opening the trunk, 463 U.S. at 
1048-53, which must be justified by probable cause. 
31. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414-17 (1976), establishes the legality of war-
rantless felony arrests outside the home. Under County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 
44, 55-58 (1991), arrestees may be held for up to forty-eight hours without being brought 
before a judicial officer, though shorter periods of detention may be the subject of constitu-
tional attack in particular cases, depending on the context and the reason for the detention. 
32. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (holding that warrantless arrests in the 
home are impermissible absent exigent circumstances). 
33. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966). This apparently includes even 
personal documents. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 
F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting the argument that a personal calendar was protected, 
notwithstanding the assumption that the calendar was an extremely personal document); 
Senate Select Comm. on Ethics v. Packwood, 845 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1994) (rejecting the 
argument that Sen. Packwood's diaries are protected by the Fifth Amendment against sub-
poena by the Senate Ethics Committee during the course of an investigation of sexual harass-
ment claims). 
34. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
35. Thus the most famous Fifth Amendment writing of the past two decades is an article 
that aims to show that no justification for the privilege works. See David Dolinko, Is There a 
Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1063 (1986). 
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large portion of the literature says that the answer is something 
akin to informational privacy. Peter Arenella, for example, argues 
that forcing someone to tell of his own wrongdoing violates the pri-
vacy of his mind and thoughts;36 Robert Gerstein suggests that it 
transgresses the privacy of one's self-judgment.37 These are basi-
cally interests in nondisclosure - in keeping a category of informa-
tion secret. Of course that is exactly what the privilege protects: 
compulsion itself is not barred, only compulsion that produces a 
kind of disclosure. That is why, as recently as a generation ago, 
privacy protection was the dominant explanation for the privilege 
among academics and judges alike.38 The interest in keeping 
secrets is not as powerful as in Fourth Amendment law, and to a 
large degree Fifth Amendment law has moved away from it.39 Yet 
secrecy remains a conventional answer, though not the only answer, 
to the question why we have a privilege in the first place. 
In other words, though privacy means many things and though 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment law protect many interests, one fairly 
well-defined and fairly narrow interest, the interest in secrecy, 
seems predominant. The primary goal of this article is to consider 
what follows from protecting that interest. Accordingly, I will use 
the word privacy in the narrower of the two senses mentioned 
above, meaning an interest in keeping things secr:et from agents of 
the government. This is not to say that there are not other sorts of 
privacy interests (there are) nor that criminal procedure should ig-
nore those interests (it shouldn't). But the brand of privacy that 
Fourth Amendment law in particular, and Fifth Amendment law to 
a lesser extent, protect most -_pri~acy ~ secregy -~ has some in-
teresting implications. It deserves -more scrutiiiy than it has 
received. 
36. Peter Arenella, Schmerber and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reap-
praisal, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 31 (1982). 
37. Robert S. Gerstein, Privacy and Self-Incrimination, 80 Ennes 87 (1970). For a sitni-
lar argument that also seeks to ground the privilege in customs involving disclosure between 
individuals, see R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 15 (1981). 
38. See, e.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 450-51 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); 
Robert B. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 SUP. CT. REv. 193. One 
indication of the link between privacy and the privilege is the traditional view of the Fifth 
Amendment as strongly linked to the Fourth. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 
(1961); 367 U.S. at 661-66 (Black, J., concurring). 
39. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (largely abandoning Fifth 
Amendment protection of the contents of documents, while retaining protection for the in-
criminating aspects of the act of producing them); see also infra notes 192-99 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the abandonment of privacy and autonomy protection in police 
interrogation law). 
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B. The Police, Process, and Substance 
Privacy in this narrower informational sense is a substantive 
value, but it can also be seen as essentially procedural. Saying that 
I have a strong privacy interest in the contents of my bedroom is 
not the same as saying that any given conduct, in or out of my bed-
room, should be free from punishment. Privacy-based limits on po-
lice investigation are limits on how the police gather information, 
not on what criminal laws they may enforce. Thus, the probable 
cause and warrant requirements do not restrict the government's 
ability to decide what should be a crime, nor does the requirement 
that suspects be given Miranda warnings when they are questioned. 
That is why Fourth Amendment law and Miranda doctrine are as-
pects of criminal procedure and why criminal procedure is not usu-
ally seen as having much impact on the contents of substantive 
criminal law. 
Yet procedural limits on police investigation of crime do have 
substantive effects, just as substantive conduct prohibitions have 
procedural effects. Consider one famous argument about the Con-
necticut birth control statute at issue in Griswold v. Connecticut. 40 
According to the majority opinion in that case, the statute criminal-
izing the use of contraceptives was improper in part because of the 
way it would have to be enforced: through police searches of mar-
ried couples' bedrooms.41 The same argument arises in debates 
about drug policy. Criminalizing drug use puts pressure on the 
legal system to tolerate police tactics such as undercover agents and 
profile-based street stops.42 In general, different substantive crimes 
lead to different kinds of investigative tactics, so that one might 
plausibly wish to consider the investigatory process when consider-
ing what to criminalize. 
The relationship works in the other direction as well. Just as a 
law banning the use of contraceptives would tend to encourage bed-
room searches, so also would a ban on bedroom searches tend to 
discourage laws prohibiting contraceptives. If decriminalizing co-
caine dealing would substantially reduce the use of undercover 
40. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
41. 381 U.S. at 485-86 ("Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of 
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to 
the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."). The argument is developed 
at somewhat greater length in Justice Douglas's opinion in the predecessor to Griswold. See 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 519-22 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
42. This argument is standard among proponents of decriminalization. See, e.g., STEVEN 
B. DUKE & ALBERT c. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST w AR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRU-
SADE AGAINST DRUGS 116-17, 123-27 (1993). 
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agents in police work, so too would a ban on undercover agents 
make it harder to punish cocaine dealing.43 A given rule of police 
procedure may come close to a ban on the prosecution of some 
kinds of crimes, and must always harm the prosecution of some 
crimes more than others. 
The substantive shadow cast by restraints on police practices can 
also extend beyond criminal law. Suppose one were to adopt the 
definition of self-incrimination used by Justice Douglas: the gov-
ernment compels self-incrimination whenever it forces someone to 
say something that will cause him serious harm, whether the harm is 
"infamy" or humiliation or possible criminal liability.44 The law 
does not follow this approach to the privilege, but if it did, the privi-
lege would disable every regulatory regime whose enforcement de-
pends on compelling testimony that is unpleasant to the person 
doing the testifying. That effect could cover a lot of ground, most of 
which is not paradigmatically criminal. Most criminal prosecutions, 
after all, do not depend on incriminating statements by the defend-
ant.45 Some legal rules outside ordinary criminal law, on the other 
hand, may be enforceable only if the government can require wit-
nesses to testify, and the number surely mushrooms if "testify" is 
broadened to include producing documents.46 A Douglas-style 
privilege would render those rules useless. 
43. This relationship between the way police can investigate crimes and the crimes they 
can investigate is not symmetrical. A ban on searches of bedrooms might indeed render a 
prohibition of contraceptive use almost unenforceable, and in that sense might look like the 
equivalent of the holding in Griswold. Yet the ban on bedroom searches is both less and 
more inclusive than the substantive ban on contraceptive laws. It is less inclusive because 
there are ways of proving contraceptive use other than bedroom searches; these would not be 
barred by the search rule. It is more inclusive because there are some things police might 
want to look for in bedrooms other than evidence of contraception. The ban on bedroom 
searches would thus limit the investigation of other crimes as well: it would make some drug 
cases harder to solve, while making contraception cases almost impossible. 
Indeed, because search and seizure rules cannot be kept wholly secret from offenders, 
these substantive effects are likely to be greater than they initially appear. If bedroom 
searches were suddenly forbidden, bedrooms would become a favorite hiding place for con-
traband that is now hidden in, say, basements. In other words, though limits on police inves-
tigation have substantive effects, the effects are complicated, and few procedural rules will be 
the precise equivalent of direct substantive restraints on the definition of crimes. Neverthe-
less, the effects themselves are real and may extend quite far. 
44. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 449-54 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting). As 
Douglas's dissent indicates, this argument has a long pedigree. See 350 U.S. at 452-54 (citing 
sources). 
45. Consider drug cases, in which the key evidence is usually physical, and the police 
often refuse any conversation with the defendant. See H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED 
ZEAL 199 (1988) (noting that New York City police officers avoided any conversation with 
narcotics suspects, relying instead on physical evidence). 
46. Through most of Douglas's judicial career, documents were treated the same as oral 
testimony for most purposes under the Fifth Amendment Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616 (1886), was still good law when Douglas wrote his dissent in Ullman, see 350 U.S. at 440-
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From the perspective of constitutional law, this is the kind of 
substantive shadow that matters most. If constitutional law has an 
"activist" sphere and a "deferential" sphere, criminal law and pro-
cedure belong in activist territory. The fact that criminal procedure 
limits criminal law is therefore not such a big deal in terms of the 
larger constitutional structure. For the past generation, day-to-day 
rules of criminal investigation and trial procedure have been the 
province of constitutional law.47 Constitutional limits on the defini-
tion of crimes, though less common, are nevertheless more ad-
vanced than substantive review of civil rules and regulations.48 It is 
surely no accident that Roe v. Wade49 and Griswold arose as chal-
lenges to criminal statutes. And the most widespread form of sub-
stantive due process is one that has been applied almost exclusively 
to criminal statutes: through void-for-vagueness doctrine, the 
courts have invalidated a whole generation of vagrancy and loiter-
ing statutes and have struck down a variety of other laws that 
criminalized seemingly innocuous conduct.so Substantive review 
outside criminal law is a good deal rarer, and more threatening: it 
harks back to a time when the courts regularly second-guessed leg-
islative judgments about regulatory matters. 
43, and Boyd applied the Fifth Amendment to a subpoena for customs invoices. See 116 U.S. 
at 617-18. 
47. Though this system of judge-made constitutional criminal procedure rules is generally 
taken for granted, it has generated some severe criticism. See CRAio M. BRADLEY, THE 
FAILURE OF THE CR!MJNAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION (1993). 
48. For a pair of familiar examples (one old and one new), see Robinson v. California, 
370 U.S. 660 (1962) (invalidating a statute that criminalized drug addiction), and R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (invalidating a criminal "hate speech" ordinance). 
49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
50. The key cases invalidating vagrancy and loitering laws are Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); and Palmer v. 
Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971). For a more modem version of the problem, see Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (invalidating a statute requiring individuals to produce credible 
identification to police on demand). For the best discussion of these cases in the literature, 
see John C. Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. 
REv. 189 (1985). 
Often vagueness cases have had First Amendment overtones. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 
415 U.S. 566 (1974) (invalidating a flag desecration statute on vagueness grounds); Note, The 
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960). But that 
has not always been the case. The problems with vagrancy and loitering statutes went far 
beyond speech issues, and the statutes themselves covered a great deal of ordinary (non-
speech) street conduct. See Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-'JYpe Law and iJs Administration, 104 U. 
PA. L. REv. 603 (1956). That seems to have been the key to their invalidation: vagrancy and 
loitering statutes allowed criminal arrest and punishment of ordinary citizens for ordinary 
conduct, which in practice meant punishment for invidious reasons. That is why I refer to 
these cases as a form of substantive due process - because the courts have essentially im-
posed substantive limits on what counts as a crime. For a similar argument, see Robert C. 
Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 CAL. L. REV. 491 
(1994). 
March 1995] Privacy's Problem 1029 
In short, rules governing police practices have substantive ef~ 
fects, both inside and outside criminal law. Privacy-based limits 
have different substantive effects than other kinds of limits. None 
of this is problematic unless the substantive effects are themselves 
problematic. And that's the rub: some ways of regulating law en-
forcement affect the scope of ordinary criminal law but not much 
else. Other methods of reining in the police have much broader 
substantive implications. Privacy-based rules, it turns out, are in the 
latter camp. 
C. Privacy's Problem 
Law enforcement, civil or criminal, depends on information. 
That information is often "private" in the sense that it rests in the 
hands of someone who would like it kept secret. This description 
fits almost all incriminating evidence in the hands of a criminal de-
fendant, information that sometimes cannot be extracted due to the 
Fifth Amendment. Much of the information the system needs is 
also "private" in a more meaningful sense. It is of a type that many 
people, not just a particular litigant, might care about keeping se-
cret. A cocaine dealer may be convicted because of drugs found in 
his bedroom closet; even those who comply with the drug laws wish 
to keep people out of their bedroom closets. A fraud conviction 
may depend on evidence of a large bank deposit on a given date; 
even wholly honest citizens value the secrecy of their bank 
transactions. 
Fourth Amendment law purports to protect most information 
that is private in this second sense. Unless the police have a facially 
valid warrant or sufficient cause together with a valid exception to 
the warrant requirement, they may not search for evidence in 
places that are both (i) hidden from public view and (ii) likely to 
contain the sorts of things that ordinary people wish to keep to 
themselves. This basic formula is well established. For example, in 
Oliver v. United States,51 the Supreme Court held that searches of 
"open fields" - basically, large tracts of land that are not too close 
to a house - are not regulated by the Fourth Amendment because 
large, open tracts of land do not usually house things that their 
owners wish to keep secret.52 On the other hand,"in United States v. 
51. 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
52. "[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amend-
ment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance. There is no socie-
tal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that 
occur in open fields." 466 U.S. at 179. On the requirement that the place being searched be 
hidden from public view, see supra note 21. 
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Karo, 53 the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does limit ef-
forts to monitor the movement of things or people inside houses, 
because houses, unlike fields, do contain things that most people 
want to keep to themselves.s4 
If one starts with this definition of private, protecting private 
information outside the criminal context would have huge substan-
tive effects, especially if the information is protected absolutely -
without any provision for disclosure in response to a showing of 
relevance or need or cause. Some criminal litigation may not de-
pend on compelled disclosure of private material. In an ordinary 
robbery case, all the testimony may be consensual and all the physi-
cal evidence may have been gathered with the cooperation of the 
victim. But in any system that seeks to do more than pro forma 
regulation of business or finance or that tries to police the distribu-
· tion of guns or drugs, absolute protection of private information is 
unacceptable unless private is defined so narrowly as to make the 
enterprise pointless. Much criminal law enforcement, and an even 
larger category of civil regulation, would be impossible. 
The short-lived regime of Boyd v. United Statesss illustrates this 
proposition. Boyd held, basically, that the government could not 
obtain documents in the possession of their legitimate owner - not 
through search and seizure, not through subpoena, not through the 
testimony of the documents' owner.56 All routes were barred: the 
documents were absolutely protected by the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments. The year after Boyd was decided, Congress passed 
the Interstate Commerce Act.57 Antitrust and bankruptcy legisla-
tion followed shortly thereafter.ss Before long, railroad officials 
were raising constitutional objections to ICC investigations,s9 debt-
53. 468 U.S. 705 {1984). 
54. 468 U.S. at 713-18. 
55. 116 U.S. 616 {1886). 
56. The documents in question were customs invoices, and they were subpoenaed in a 
civil forfeiture proceeding. 116 U.S: at 618. Early in its opinion the Court concluded that the 
subpoena should be treated no differently than a search. 116 U.S. at 621-22. In the course of 
discussing whether this "search" was constitutionally unreasonable, the Court declared that it 
was no different than compelled testimony, which would obviously be barred by the Fifth 
Amendment. 116 U.S. at 633. Thus, where Boyd applied, the means by which the govern· 
ment obtained the evidence apparently did not matter: searches, subpoenas, and oral testi-
mony alike were barred. 
57. 24 Stat. 379 {1887} {codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
58. The Sherman Antitrust Act was passed three years after the ICA. Sherman Act, ch. 
647, 26 Stat. 209 {1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 {1988)). Federal bankruptcy 
legislation was passed eight years later. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 
(repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 {1988)). 
59. See, e.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 {1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 
547 (1892). 
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ors were seeking to bar production of documents in bankruptcy 
proceedings,60 and antitrust violators were trying to use the privi-
lege to shield themselves from liability.61 The Supreme Court 
shortly concluded that if it took Boyd seriously, government regula.:. 
tion would be impossible.62 That was the beginning of the end of 
Boyd. The Court created a series of arbitrary "outs" from the pro-
tection, sometimes explicitly acknowledging that it was doing so in 
order to avoid disabling the government from pursuing various 
kinds of socially useful regulation.63 
Boyd's troubled history shows that absolute protection for any 
substantial class of private information is incompatible with a lot of 
government activity.64 That raises an obvious question: How can 
the system constitutionally protect private information without 
casting such a large substantive shadow? The answer seems easy: 
relax the protection. Privacy can be protected but not absolutely; 
given some form of balancing, it should be possible to shield indi-
vidual privacy interests without endangering the modem state's 
ability to regulate. But balancing does not remove the substantive 
shadow. Balancing only transforms a flat prohibition into open-
ended substantive judicial review. 
Consider how balancing might work. It seems initially plausible 
to suppose that if one weighs the individuai's interest in keeping 
things private against the state's interest in disclosure, one can pro-
tect most of what Boyd protected while still allowing the govern-
ment to do its job. The obvious mechanism is some kind of "need" 
requirement - a regime that forces the government to show that it 
has a good reason for wanting the stuff, good enough to outweigh 
the individual's privacy interest. That is what the probable cause 
and rea~onable suspicion standards in Fourth Amendment law are 
ostensibly about. Those standards say that the police cannot in-
spect the contents of the glove compartment of my car just because 
60. See, e.g., In re Harris, 164 F. 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1908), affd. 190 F. 1018 (2d Cir. 1911); In 
re Hess, 134 F. 109 (E.D. Pa. 1905); Potter v. Beal, 49 F. 793 (C.C.D. Mass. 1892). In one of 
his earliest opinions, Judge Learned Hand held that a bankrupt had waived any self-incrimi-
nation claim he might make when he turned his books over to the receiver without objection. 
In re Tracy & Co., 177 F. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1910). 
61. See, e.g., In re Hale, 139 F. 496 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1905), affd. sub nom Hale v. Henkel, 
201 U.S. 43 (1906). 
62. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906). 
63. See infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text. 
64. One might argue that our system has always protected some pockets of private infor-
mation through evidentiary privileges outside of the Fifth Amendment. But that sort of pri-
vacy protection is different because it protects information that has already been disclosed. 
In other words, evidentiary privileges encourage disclosure in certain relationships rather 
than protecting private information against disclosure. 
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some officer wants to look, but the police can look if they have 
good reason to believe the glove compartment contains something 
that suggests criminal behavior. The government's interest in 
stamping out crime justifies the search, but only if it can show why, 
ex ante, the search is likely to advance that interest. My privacy 
seems to be protected, and the government's ability to punish 
crimes seems only trivially impaired. 
Unfortunately, requiring something akin to probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion is often impractical. The government needs 
certain kinds of information from taxpayers in order to enforce the 
tax laws. It cannot require disclosure only in cases in which it has 
some basis for suspecting a violation, because then it could not un-
cover violations. If the government must show case-by-case need 
for the information, it must recast the tax laws so that such informa-
tion is not important. Privacy protection would act as a substantive 
prohibition. So too with OSHA inspections, or inspections to en-
force building and fire codes, or record-keeping requirements at-
tendant to affirmative action decrees, or proxy statements that must 
be filed with the SEC. In all these areas, the type of regulation that 
the government seeks to perform is impossible without compelled 
"suspicionless" disclosure - disclosure that precedes any showing 
that the government has a strong interest in obtaining the informa-
tion in this case. 
Balancing is still possible in such cases, but it looks a lot like 
open-ended review of the reasonableness of the government's regu-
latory regime. Even when suspicionless review is necessary for the 
particular regulatory regime, the government has an interest, per-
haps a strong interest, in getting the information. But that interest 
is different from the interest in finding out the contents of my glove 
compartment. The government's "need" argument in the'se typical 
regulatory settings is not the need to engage in this particular 
search. Rather, the relevant government interest is the interest in 
having the regulatory regime. The real claim is that without the 
power to get this information, the government cannot have these 
tax code provisions, or these OSHA regulations, or these affirma-
tive action orders, or these securities rules. 
That claim does not do away with balancing. It just moves the 
balance to a higher level of generality: Is this regulation important 
enough to justify the invasion of privacy required to enforce it? 
Take, for example, a fairly routine item on an individual tax form. 
One who claims a charitable deduction of noncash property must 
report the name of the charity to which the property was given if 
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the property's value exceeds five hundred dollars.6s Tax forms re-
quire many disclosures of this sort, usually as a means of increasing 
compliance with the law. The disclosure of the name of the donee 
is not necessary in order to have the underlying revenue rules: it is 
not like the requirement that gross income be stated. But it is a 
useful means of reducing fraudulent deductions. Indeed, until a 
couple of years ago, the same requirement applied to cash dona-
tions of over three thousand dollars in any_ one year to a single 
recipient. 66 
This information is undoubtedly private in any ordinary sense of 
the word, and it more than exceeds the Fourth Amendment privacy 
threshold. The objects of my charity are much more sensitive than 
the usual contents of my glove compartment, and the latter are pro-
tected against unreasonable searches. Meanwhile, a probable cause 
or reasonable suspicion requirement, the usual response of Fourth 
Amendment law to threatened privacy interests, would be unwork-
able in this context. Disclosure_ must. be required across the board 
or it is useless. Thus constitutional balancing, Fourth Amendment 
style, would have to look something like the following: On one side 
is the interest in secrecy of all those who must tell the IRS the 
names of their favorite charities. On the other side is the govern-
ment's interest in having the disclosure rule. Though the latter in-
terest may not be trivial, it is hardly overwhelming. The 
government could structure the rules in ways that required less dis-
closure, or it could abandon the requirement altogether and simply 
live with some additional noncompliance. Neither possibility is un-
thinkable. How substantial is taxpayers' "interest in secrecy? It is 
hard to say, but this privacy interest is surely at least as strong as 
the interest in the sanctity of glove compartments and lunch bags 
and jacket pockets - all areas where Fourth Amendment law pro-
tects individuals' interest in nondisclosure. 
The result of the weighing process may not be absolutely clear. 
But the nature of the process should be transparent: it is reasona-
bleness review of ordinary regulatory legislation. If the privacy in-
terest is substantial, and in Fourth Amendment terms it plainly is, 
the tax rule would be upheld only if the government's interest was 
at least as strong. The weight given the government's interest 
would be a question for the courts, not for Congress or the IRS, just 
as courts, and not the police, determine how much weight to attach 
65. Schedule A, I.R.S. Form 1040, at 1.14 (1993). The name of the organization must be 
reported on Form 8283, line 1, column (a). 
66. See I.R.S. Form 1040, Schedule A, at line 14 (1989). 
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to law enforcement needs when deciding whether particular 
searches and seizures are reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment. A court striking this balance would have to decide whether 
the government had a good reason, not just a rational basis, for 
requiring disclosure of this information in this way instead of adopt-
ing some other regulatory path.67 In other words, the court would 
have to engage in open-ended, nondeferential substantive review of 
the relevant rule. 
That, in a nutshell, is the substantive problem with protecting 
the kinds of privacy interests we claim to protect in search and 
seizure cases. Wherever the regulatory state engages in any form of 
compelled information gathering (and it does so everywhere), there 
is an enormous cost to taking privacy interests seriously: doing so 
requires judicial judgments about whether one regulatory path is 
more reasonable than another. That sounds uncomfortably close to 
the regime that the Supreme Court sought to bury a half-century 
ago. 
D. Solutions That Don't Work 
Judges are not about to start invalidating commonplace items on 
tax forms on Fourth Amendment grounds. Nor should they. But 
explaining why not turns out to be hard, given that the system pro-
tects much weaker privacy interests against invasion by the police. 
The only principled way to avoid unacceptable outcomes is to find 
ways to distinguish the kinds of privacy intrusions police inflict on 
criminal suspects from the kinds of intrusions that civil regulatory 
regimes inflict on their targets - in order to justify regulating the 
former quite carefully while leaving the latter pretty much alone. 
67. In an interesting and insightful recent article, Scott Sundby argues that the very per-
vasiveness of privacy intrusions in the regulatory state might tend to skew this balance: the 
more regularly privacy is infringed, the less important it seems when weighed against the 
government's interests. Sundby, supra note 4, at 1760-61. Arguably the same thing is true on 
the criminal procedure side. The kinds of technological advances that make privacy intru-
sions both possible and more common tend to undermine the importance of the privacy 
interest in the law of search and seizure. Id. at 1761-63. 
These points are correct: privacy protection has declined in important ways within crimi-
nal procedure, and it has almost disappeared elsewhere. But the law has not simply aban-
doned the interest in keeping secrets. Rather, that interest has been preserved but within a 
narrowed sphere. To put it another way, different perspectives lead to different conclusions 
about the degree to which privacy is still protected in Fourth Amendment law. If one com-
pares the current regime to, say, the rule in Boyd, one is struck by how little privacy protec-
tion remains. On the other hand, if one compares current search and seizure law to the law 
(such as it is) that governs information gathering outside the context of ordinary criminal 
investigation, the surprising thing is how much Fourth Amendment law protects privacy in 
run-of-the-mill criminal cases. My aim is to explore the latter comparison, and thereby to get 
a better sense of the law's inconsistencies. 
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And several possible separating mechanisms exist. In fact, the law 
has embraced most of them at one time or another. Unfortunately, 
none of them works. 
1. Categorical Balancing 
Perhaps privacy interests are protected as much outside the 
sphere of criminal investigation as inside that sphere. The govern-
ment may have more leeway with tax forms than with drug busts 
because it has a stronger interest in collecting taxes than in enforc-
ing the drug laws, or because the relevant privacy interests are 
weaker in the tax context. Perhaps balancing takes place in both 
areas, but in regulatory settings the government's side of the scale is 
always heavier. 
The argument is tempting, but wrong. The strength of the gov-
ernment's interest in any particular regulatory regime is, to put it 
mildly, highly contestable. That, after all, is why judicial review of 
the sort embodied by Lochner v. New York6B was such a problem. 
Moreover, in a consistent privacy-protective system the government 
would typically have to defend not the tax code as a whole, but only 
the particular feature of it that caused the relevant privacy invasion. 
No court would need to choose between privacy protection and the 
tax code or OSHA, for the relevant tax or safety rules could always 
be recast to require less disclosure. Remember that the IRS need 
not require the charitable contribution disclosure mentioned above: 
it could always keep the deduction, abandon the disclosure require-
ment, and live with a little more noncompliance. It is very hard to 
imagine that the government's interest in particular regulatory rules 
- rules like the charitable contribution disclosure requirement -
is always so strong, across the board, that it outweighs the harm to 
privacy. 
Indeed, one would think that the government's interest in most 
criminal settings would be stronger than the parallel interests at 
stake in tax disputes or OSHA investigations. Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment law apply to murder and rape and robbery cases, 
where the public interest in catching and punishing offenders is very 
high indeed. Unless there is a huge disparity in privacy interests 
running in the opposite direction, balancing should give the police 
more leeway than civil regulators, not less. 
Nor are privacy interests obviously stronger in criminal settings 
than in civil ones. They may be weaker. Building inspections, tax 
68. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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forms, searches of government employees' files - all these involve 
more intrusion on privacy interests than searches of automobiles 
and suitcases, not to mention lunch bags and jacket pockets. Of 
course, there are some things police do that are more intrusive than 
anything the government does outside the realm of criminal investi-
gation. Wiretaps are a good example: OSHA does not intrude on 
personal conversations. Searches of private homes may be another, 
because the regulatory state does not require rummaging through 
bedroom closets. But most police searches are not in houses and do 
not involve electronic eavesdropping. With respect to the mass of 
car searches and street stop-and-frisks, the informational privacy in-
terest at stake does not seem any weightier than the taxpayer's in-
terest in keeping secret the objects of his charity. 
Thus, it is hard to see how any plausible balance of privacy in-
terests and government need could yield both current levels of 
Fourth Amendment protection and current levels of regulatory dis-
cretion. The interest in regulation is probably weaker than the in-
terest in criminal law enforcement. Excluding house searches and 
wiretaps, privacy interests are not obviously different in the two set-
tings, or if they are, the difference cuts in the wrong direction. No 
consistent regime would both protect privacy interests in briefcases 
or trunks of cars or jacket pockets when the police wish to search 
those places and also ignore privacy interests in the sorts of infor-
mation the government wants in other settings. 
2. Drawing Lines Between Individuals and Institutions 
A good deal of what the regulatory state seeks to regulate is the 
conduct of institutions: corporations, partnerships, labor unions, 
and the like. These institutions, most people would say, do not 
have the same sorts of privacy interests as individuals. A corpora-
tion may prefer that some piece of financial information remain se-
cret in order to prevent competitors from copying its investment 
successes, but this privacy interest is nothing more than the accumu-
lated interests of the shareholders in maximizing the corporation's 
value, coupled with the interests of employees and officers in keep-
ing their jobs. Since the New Deal, constitutional law has not pro-
tected purely economic interests of this sort, at least not outside the 
Takings Clause. And there is nothing irrational about a regime that 
protects informational privacy only to the extent it causes some 
noneconomic, intangible harm - harm of a sort that people, not 
institutions, can feel. 
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Current Fourth and Fifth Amendment law draws precisely this 
line. Fourth Amendment law protects corporations, but only nomi-
nally. 69 Meanwhile, the privilege against self-incrimination does 
not apply to corporations (or other groups, for that matter) at an.10 
This difference in treatment is perhaps an effort to protect individu-
als against privacy intrusions from the police without protecting in-
stitutions' interest in keeping regulation at bay. 
'I\vo obstacles, however, prevent solving privacy's problem by 
drawing lines between individuals and institutions. First, even if 
one sets criminal investigation to one side, a great deal of govern-
ment information gathering targets individuals. Tax forms are the 
most obvious example. Searches of government employees by their 
employers are another.71 A line between individuals and institu-
tions may have saved the regulatory state at the tum of the century, 
but the state's reach is surely too broad for that tactic to work now. 
Second, even if harm to privacy is defined in purely dignitary 
terms, privacy is something that individuals possess within institu-
tions, not just outside them. When the government seeks to find 
something out about the place where I work, the information it 
seeks may embarrass me personally. If one is to protect privacy 
consistently, that interest must receive the same weight as the inter-
est in keeping secret the contents of my briefcase when I am 
stopped on the street by a police officer. Yet if claims by individu-
als within institutions "count," the systei;n unravels; the effect is al-
most the same as giving the institution itself a protectible privacy 
interest. 
This point surfaces in a recent case involving the application of 
the Fifth Amendment to corporate employees. Individuals may re-
fuse to comply with a grand jury subpoena if the act of producing 
the thing asked for would tend to incriminate them.72 Corporations 
do not have this privilege, as the Court reaffirmed in Braswell v. 
United States. 13 But under Braswell, corporate employees are 
treated not like individuals (which is what they are), but like corpo-
rations. A corporate officer cannot refuse to produce corporate 
69. For typical statements that businesses receive less Fourth Amendment protection 
than individuals, see Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237-38 {1986), and 
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981). 
70. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 115-17 (1988). 
71. Cf. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 {1987). 
72. F!Sher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). For the best discussion of this doctrine, 
see Robert P. Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amendment Seriously, 
73 VA. L. REv. 1 {1987). 
73. 487 U.S. 99 {1988). 
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documents in his custody, even if the act of producing the docu-
ments would incriminate the officer personally.14 The officer's in-
terest does not count for Fifth Amendment purposes as long as he 
is acting as an officer. The rule that corporations are not covered 
by the privilege cannot justify this result. The officer loses even if 
he is trying to protect his own interest, not the corporation's. Yet if 
the rule were otherwise, the system might not function. Documents 
that incriminate the corporation also tend to incriminate individuals 
within the corporation, so a privilege that covered Braswell might 
not differ much from a privilege that covered his corporate 
employer.75 
Braswell shows why it will not do to say that privacy interests 
can be protected for "individual" activities but not institutional 
ones. Institutions consist of people, and people care about keeping 
secrets. Privacy interests run through the whole of individuals' 
lives, much of which is lived out within institutions. Even if the 
Constitution protects only real persons and not artificial ones, seri-
ous privacy protection cannot avoid interfering with the business of 
regulating institutions. 
3. The Search-Subpoena Line 
There is a line in criminal procedure that might help resolve the 
tension between privacy protection within the criminal sphere and 
its absence without. Although police searches are subject to prob-
able cause and reasonable suspicion standards and sometimes to a 
warrant requirement, grand jury subpoenas are much less heavily 
regulated. As long as the material asked for is relevant to the grand 
jury's investigation and as long as compliance with the subpoena is 
not too burdensome, the subpoena is enforced. No showing of 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion is necessary, and courts 
measure relevance and burden with a heavy thumb on the govern-
ment's side of the scales.76 
74. 487 U.S. at 109-17. The employee does receive partial immunity: in any subsequent 
criminal prosecution of the employee, the government may not introduce into evidence the 
fact that the employee personally produced the corporate documents. 487 U.S. at 117-18. 
Notwithstanding this partial immunity, the government gains enormously from the em-
ployee's act of production. The government may use both the documents themselves and 
evidence of the corporation's act of production against the employee, even in cases, like 
Braswell, in which the corporation is wholly owned and administered by the individual claim-
ing the privilege. 
75. For an elaboration of this point, see Wtlliam J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 
88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1279-80 (1988). 
76. SARA SUN BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAw & PRAcnCB §§ 6:09, 
6:26-27 (1986); 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIOHr, FEDERAL PRAcnCB AND PROCEDURE §§ 274-75 
(1982). 
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The law's different treatment of searches and subpoenas might 
stem from a kind of overbreadth problem. When the police search 
a car, they see anything that happens to be in the car, not just guns 
or drugs. A subpoena, on the other hand, asks only for the evi-
dence being sought; nothing else need be disclosed. This difference 
could suggest that searches by their very nature invade privacy 
more than subpoenas do. To play out the argument, government 
information gathering in the civil sphere might resemble subpoenas 
and not searches. Tax forms, after all, ask only for the information 
the government needs under the tax laws, not for generalized finan-
cial disclosure. If the pattern holds elsewhere, the conflict between 
privacy protection in criminal procedure and its absence elsewhere 
might be only apparent. 
This argument has two serious flaws. First, a great deal of regu-
latory information gathering does not conform to the subpoena 
model. OSHA and EPA not only subpoena documents, they search 
targets' businesses as well.77 Government employers search em-
ployees' desks and file cabinets;1s school principals search students' 
lockers.79 There is no privacy-based reason for treating these 
searches differently from police searches; the overbreadth phenom-
enon is the same in both settings. Even if the line between searches 
and subpoenas makes sense in privacy terms, it can only reduce pri-
vacy's substantive shadow, not eliminate it. 
The second flaw is more fundamental: the line is incoherent in 
privacy terms. The Boyd Court understood this - the Justices ap-
plied the full force of Fourth and Fifth Amendment protection to a 
subpoena for customs invoices - and nothing since Boyd has un-
dermined its reasoning. The relevant privacy interest is the interest 
in keeping secret whatever the government is examining. The prob-
lem with a typical search is that the government's agent is examin-
ing whatever happens to be there, not just guns or cocaine. There 
may be no legitimate interest in keeping the guns or cocaine se-
cret, so but the officer sees innocent (albeit potentially embarrass-
ing) things as well. Hence the overbreadth concern. But subpoenas 
do not do away with this problem unless they seek only "guilty" 
information - which they don't. Subpoenas for :financial records 
77. See, e.g., Donovan v. Masher Steel Corp., 791F.2d1535 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 1030 (1987); Hartford Assoc. v. United States, 792 F. Supp. 358 (D.N.J. 1992); 
Pieper v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 94 (D. Minn. 1978), affd., 604 F.2d 1131 (8th Cir. 1979). 
78. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). · 
79. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363 (Mass. 1992). 
80. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth 
Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1229 (1983). 
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or correspondence are common, and these documents can include a 
great deal of legitimately private information. Just as the police of-
ficer must search the whole car to find the hidden cocaine, the sub-
poena must demand a great deal of innocent-but-private material in 
order to turn up the "smoking gun" document. 
And much more than in criminal investigations, the information 
the government seeks in civil settings tends to be "innocent" rather 
than "guilty." The charitable contribution disclosure is a good ex-
ample. Indeed, in any across-the-board disclosure regime, most of 
the disclosure is about legitimate conduct. A great many law-abid-
ing taxpayers must disclose a great deal about their finances in or-
der to help catch a few frauds. For privacy purposes, this 
information should count just as much as the innocent information 
the government discovers when searching the trunk of a car for 
drugs. The overbreadth concern is real, but it does not justify any 
sharp line between the criminal justice system and the regulatory 
state. On the contrary, it suggests that privacy protection within the 
criminal justice system is seriously incomplete. 
4. The Right-Privilege Distinction 
Let us return to the example of charitable deductions and dis-
closure of the identity of the donee. The government might argue 
that the privacy objection to this required disclosure is wholly mis-
guided, because the taxpayer need not disclose anything. If he does 
not want to share the information, he does not have to claim the 
deduction. Disclosure is required only as a condition to the receipt 
of money back from the government - only as a "string" attached 
to a government "gift." The police invade privacy differently. Po-
lice officers who search people's cars are not granting favors; they 
are forcibly intruding on citizens' lives. 
This argument requires one to adopt a very strong version of the 
right-privilege distinction.81 In the charitable deduction example, it 
requires that one treat the money as belonging to the government, 
which then bestows deductions as a matter of grace on whatever 
conditions it chooses. But in a regime with such a strong right-priv-
ilege distinction, privacy could not be protected in either the crimi-
nal or civil spheres. The state lic.enses cars and drivers, and it builds 
the roads they use. The state might grant permission to drive on its 
roads only in return for permission to search automobiles as its po-
81. A much stronger version than our system has adopted, at least for the past genera-
tion. See Wtlliam W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tU:mal Law, 81 liARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968). 
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lice forces wish, with or without probable cause. This position is as 
plausible, or implausible, as the claim that the government can re-
quire otherwise private information from taxpayers as a condition 
of granting tax deductions. 
Yet courts would not think of buying the argument for suspi-
cionless car searches.82 The response would be that whatever 
power such arguments have, it is too late in the day to regard every 
potential greater government power as authorizing any exercise of 
supposedly lesser authority. The same point must hold true for 
taxes and licensing requirements and the many other regulatory set-
tings in which the government both bestows benefits and requires 
disclosure. Whatever view of the right-privilege distinction one 
takes, that distinction cannot separate the criminal sphere from 
everything else. 
5. Separating Disclosure to the Government From Disclosure to 
the Public 
One might plausibly say that telling the IRS who receives my 
charitable contributions does not really intrude on my privacy very 
much. After all, my friends and neighbors and co-workers do not 
know; the only people who have the information are a few govern-
ment employees who have no contact with me, do not know or care 
who I am, and are under strict orders not to spread such informa-
tion around. Perhaps one need not take privacy interests very seri-
ously in regulatory contexts because those interests are not 
seriously infringed. 
This is a substantial argument. The harm that stems from the 
discovery of secrets depends on who does the discovering, and on 
whether the information is subsequently spread.83 And a great deal 
of compelled information gathering occurs in ways that ensure that 
82. The Supreme Court has recognized the states' "pervasive regulation" of automobiles 
as a justification for lesser Fourth Amendment protection. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 
113 (1986) (holding that a car owner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle 
identification number, which by law must be visible from outside the car). But lesser protec-
tion does not mean no protection. 475 U.S. at 112 ("A citizen does not surrender all the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment by entering an automobile."). The police must have 
reasonable suspicion in order to stop a car other than as part of a roadblock, Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979), and must have probable cause (although not a warrant) in 
order to search it, see, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Thus, the police are 
subject to substantial constitutional restrictions when searching cars and cannot evade those 
restrictions by citing the state's sweeping regulatory authority. 
83. For a pair of rare acknowledgments of this point in· the literature, see Seth F. 
Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure 
in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1991) and Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data 
Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 ThxAs L. REV. - (1995). 
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the information stays secret vis-a-vis the public. Indeed, the federal 
Privacy Act84 often requires as much. As long as the handling of 
the information is carefully policed - as long as the IRS cannot 
leak the contents of particular tax returns - the system can both 
protect privacy and require disclosure of a great deal of private 
information. 
But while it makes sense to discriminate among different kinds 
of compelled disclosure on the basis of who receives the informa-
tion, that does not solve the problem with constitutional protection 
of privacy interests. After all, the argument applies as much to the 
police as to the IRS. A police officer searching my briefcase will 
not necessarily tell anyone what he finds as long as he does not find 
evidence of crime. And if publicizing innocent personal informa-
tion is the harm the law protects against, the law should regulate 
police behavior after a search much more severely than it now 
does.85 Indeed, if public disclosure, as opposed to disclosure to the 
government, is what the Constitution guards against, Fourth 
Amendment law should be wholly reoriented. It should restrict po-
lice searches a good deal less than it now does, and it should restrict 
post-search police behavior much more. Such a regime would 
largely do away with privacy-based restrictions on police evidence 
gathering: it would make the law governing the police more like 
the law that now governs the IRS, not the other way around. Dis-
tinguishing between public disclosure and disclosure to the govern-
ment offers no means of reconciling criminal procedure's protection 
of privacy with the lax approach taken outside the criminal sphere. 
Instead, it suggests that the kind of privacy protection the criminal 
procedure system purports to provide is mostly misguided. 
6. Privacy as a Remedy, Not a Right 
Suppose the main point of the constitutional law regulating the 
police were to limit the use of coercion and violence in law enforce-
ment.86 One might still see courts paying a great deal of attention 
to what police officers saw, heard, and found, as long as the domi-
nant remedy for police misconduct was the exclusionary rule. The 
law might appear to be protecting privacy, but it would actually be 
84. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988): 
85. Currently, such regulation is left to state and local law and custom. See Paul v. Davis, 
424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
86. As I argue infra in Part Ill it should be. 
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using the threat of the suppression remedy to protect something 
very different. Privacy protection would be a remedy, not a right.87 
Perhaps this account describes the current system. That would 
explain the inconsistency with which privacy is protected in criminal 
procedure. It might also explain why constitutional law treats po-
lice searches so differently from other kinds of government infor-
mation gathering. 
This line of argument may be the strongest response to the claim 
that criminal procedure is out of sync with the rest of constitutional 
law. Current Fourth Amendment law does tend to protect privacy 
primarily where there is some danger of police coercion, which sug-
gests that privacy language could be a screen for something else. 
Yet when police coercion is a potential problem, the law still pro-
tects privacy, not the freedom from unreasonable coercion. The fo-
cus is still on what the police officer saw and what justification he 
had for seeing it, not on how much force he used and whether it was 
reasonable under the circumstances. The Supreme Court penalizes 
an officer for turning over a stereo turntable to look at a serial 
number without sufficient cause,ss but the same Court ignores un-
provoked police violence during the course of an otherwise legal 
search of a private home.89 The law requires more of a justification 
for searching a suspect's pockets than for grabbing him, spinning 
him around, and shoving him against the wall of a building. 90 
To be sure, Fourth Amendment law sometimes does focus di-
rectly on the level of police coercion. Tennessee v. Gamer,91 the 
case that established Fourth Amendment limits on police use of 
deadly force, is a prime example. But cases like Gamer are telling 
precisely because they are so rare. For every reported decision dis-
cussing the law of deadly force, dozens discuss the rules that govern 
automobile searches.92 And amazingly, there is virtually no case 
law governing the use of nondeadly force.93 No one knows what 
fr!. This is essentially the argument Professor Seidman makes elsewhere in this issue. See 
Louis Michael Seidman, The Problem with Privacy's Problem, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1079, 1086-
92 (1995). 
88. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987). 
89. See infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text (discussing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U.S. 635 (1987)). 
90. See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text. 
91. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
92. Compare 2 LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 5.l(d), and cases cited therein (discussing 
deadly force claims) with 3 LAFAVE, supra note 29, §§ 7.1-7.5, and cases cited therein (dis-
cussing various sorts of automobile searches). 
93. Tue law of police use of nondeadly force consists of the requirement that the force be 
constitutionally reasonable under all the circumstances. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 
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the Fourth Amendment requires before an officer strikes a suspect 
because courts do not discuss the issue - they are too busy discuss-
ing the terms under which officers can open paper bags found in 
cars.94 Coercion becomes the law's focus only in cases like Gamer 
- that is, only in the most extreme cases. Elsewhere, the law's 
chief concern remains privacy. 
In other words, privacy protection is more than just a remedy in 
criminal procedure; it is the heart of the liability rule. For the most 
part, the law does not suppress evidence when the police have be-
haved too coercively. It suppresses evidence when the police have 
seen and heard things they were not supposed to see and hear. Co-
ercion matters in the law of criminal procedure, but privacy matters 
more. That is the heart of the conflict: in criminal procedure, the 
law worries a great deal about what the government is and is not 
supposed to see; elsewhere, the government can see just about any-
thing it wants. 
7. Representation Reinforcement 
Last but certainly not least, one might argue that privacy should 
be protected in criminal procedure because criminal suspects can-
not protect their own interests through the political process. If the 
Constitution does not protect the privacy interests of this disadvan-
taged class, those interests will receive no protection at all. The 
regulatory state's targets are situated differently. They are, broadly 
speaking, more than able to guard their interests through political 
means, so constitutional (read: judicial) protection matters a lot 
less. On this account, there is no inconsistency to explain. Consti-
386, 396-99 (1989). The Court in Graham does not define this standard, except to say that it 
is objective - the police officer's good or bad faith is beside the point, 490 U.S. at 397 - and 
that 
its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each 
particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an 
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively re-
sisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. 
490 U.S. at 396. One searches in vain for any body of case law that gives this standard some 
content. Cf. Rowland v. Perry, 41F.3d167, 173·74 (4th Cir. 1994) (reasoning that nondeadly 
use of force should be proportional to the crime involved). 
Of course, the exclusionary rule has something to do with this: by focusing attention on 
the illegal discovery of evidence, it tends to focus the law's protection on privacy. See infra 
notes 201-03 and accompanying text. But the exclusionary rule does not dictate the degree to 
which the law focuses on privacy. Courts could, after all, suppress evidence in house search 
cases when the entry was legal but the search was carried out too violently or with needless 
humiliation to the occupants. So far as I am aware {and so far as anyone in the literature has 
noticed), they never do so. 
94. See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) {discussed infra at notes 170-75 and 
accompanying text). 
March 1995] Privacy's Problem 1045 
tutional law protects privacy when it needs to and ignores privacy 
when it can. 
This line of argument is powerful, but ultimately unsatisfying. It 
is. powerful because the criminal justice system does indeed have 
class and race biases. Poor people and black people are more likely 
to be caught in its web than middle- or upper-class whites.9s That 
gives rise to a classic Carolene Products96 argument for special con-
stitutional scrutiny. John Hart Ely made exactly that argument 
when justifying constitutional search and seizure law in political 
process terms, calling the Fourth Amendment a "harbinger of the 
Equal Protection Clause" and noting the "tremendous potential for 
the arbitrary or invidious infliction of 'unusually' severe punish-
ments on persons of various classes other than 'our own.' "97 On 
the other side of the fence, the classes of people most affected by 
the regulatory state do seem to have at least their share of political 
clout, so that one must stretch to make process arguments for spe-
cial judicial protection for, say, taxpayers or the targets of EPA 
investigations. 
But the argument does not go far enough. In order to justify 
remedying the inadequate privacy protection afforded criminal sus-
pects, one must first show that the protection offered by the polit-
ical process is inadequate. Here as elsewhere, Ely's argument 
requires a substantive hook, a judgment that there is a problem 
worth fixing. In order to justify the phenomenon at issue here, that 
problem must be tied to privacy, to the interest in keeping secrets 
from the government. 
This is where the political process argument runs into trouble. 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment law do not simply replicate the pri-
95. The high percentage of defendants whose indigence qualifies them for appointed 
counsel shows how disproportionately poor criminal defendants are. See, e.g., Richard Klein, 
The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render the Ineffective Assist-
ance of Counsel, 68 lND. LJ. 363, 379 n.102 (1993) (noting that "[e]ighty-five percent of 
criminal defendants in the District of Columbia financially qualify for court-appointed coun-
sel"); Jeffrey R. Rutherford, Comment, Dziubak v. Mott and the Need to Better Balance the 
Interests of the Indigent Accused and Public Defenders, 78 MINN. L. REv. 977, 987 n.48 (1994) 
(noting that the comparable figure for the two most populous counties in Minnesota is eighty 
percent). See also Andy Court, Is There A Crisis?, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 46 (estimat-
ing eighty percent of defendants nationwide are indigent). 
For evidence that the target of police officers' and prosecutors' attention are dispropor-
tionately black, see U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, STATISTICAL .ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 198 (113th ed. 1993); Douglas A. Smith et al., Equity and Discretionary Justice: The 
Influence of Race on Police Arrest Decisions, 75 J. CruM. L. & CruM!NoLOGY 234 {1984); 
Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1472, 1495-96 
(1988). 
96. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 {1938). 
97. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 97 (1980). 
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vacy protection that people receive from the regulatory state. On 
the contrary, Fourth and Fifth Amendment law seems to give crimi-
nal suspects more privacy protection than ordinary citizens get from 
government employers, tax collection agencies, and the like. This is 
the puzzle that needs explaining: informational privacy is taken 
much more seriously when the police search drug suspects than 
when localities enforce building codes or the IRS audits tax returns. 
Constitutional law is not bringing the politically powerless up to the 
level of the powerful; in this limited sense, the powerless do better. 
This phenomenon is not just a function of the different conse-
quences of civil regulation and criminal law enforcement. Those 
subject to police searches often go to jail, while the risks run by 
regulated actors are usually less serious. But this has nothing to do 
with privacy protection. When criminal defendants go to jail they 
do so not becau~e they were searched (except in the most artificial 
sense), but because they were found guilty of criminal offenses.98 
Indeed, Fourth Amendment law gives no weight to the privacy in-
terest in evidence of crime;99 privacy protection focuses on the inter-
ests of those who are not charged and convicted, not those who are. 
Nor does the gap in privacy protection make sense as a response 
to other kinds of police misconduct. One might make a very good 
process theory argument for constitutional regulation of the police, 
but it does not follow that that regulation should focus on privacy. 
The puzzle remains: privacy receives more protection in the realm 
of criminal law enforcement than in the regulatory arena. Repre-
sentation reinforcement cannot justify that state of affairs. 
Indeed, nonconstitutional law - the law most subject to the 
democratic process - does not seem to give much weight to the 
interest in keeping secrets. Disclosure requirements abound.too 
There are limits: for example, the Privacy Act101 severely restricts 
official use of private information about individual citizens.102 But 
as with the Privacy Act itself, those limits mostly bear on what can 
be done with information once the government has it. The amount 
of compelled disclosure remains enormous. Aside from limits on 
98. For the best elaboration of this point, see John C. Jeffries, Jr., Damages for Constitu· 
tional Violations: The Relation of Risk to Injury in Constitutional Torts, 15 VA. L. REv. 1461, 
1474-76 (1989). 
99. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
100. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 83, at 3-5 nn.2·4 and sources cited therein. 
101. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988). 
102. See generally 1 JUSTIN D. FRANKLIN & ROBERT F. BOUCHARD, GUIDEBOOK TO nm 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND l'RivACY Acrs §§ 2.01-.13 (2d ed. 1986). 
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electronic eavesdropping103 and on the ability of government offi-
cials to spread information around once they get it, there are few 
legal constraints on regulators' ability to demand information from 
ordinary citizens. Either the political process never works - in 
which case process theory falls apart - or we should take this as a 
signal that criminal procedure's focus on privacy is misplaced. 
Either way, the political process argument fails. 
E. The Problem Revisited 
In its guise as an interest in keeping secrets, privacy is a poor 
separating mechanism: it does not distinguish what the police do 
from what the rest of the government does. If the government is 
everywhere, privacy intrusions are everywhere. If we take them se-
riously when the intruders wear police uniforms, we should presum-
ably do so elsewhere. But taking privacy seriously means a great 
deal of open-ended judicial balancing of privacy interests against 
the government's regulatory needs. That is akin to turning "ra-
tional basis" review into "reasonableness" review and giving "rea-
sonableness" a good deal of bite. And that is akin to what courts 
did in the Lochner era. 
This problem casts an interesting light on the typical academic 
complaint about the law of criminal investigation. A large amount 
of Fourth Amendment commentary attacks the basic hypocrisy 
within the law of criminal procedure. The system takes privacy very 
seriously in some settings - house searches, for example - but 
offers almost no privacy protection in others, such as requests for 
bank or phone records. The standard theme of this literature is that 
the law should take house searches as a model, that it should aban-
don its hypocrisy by giving privacy substantial protection across the 
board.104 Yet even if the critics' wishes were answered, a much 
103. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
104. Much of the best Fourth Amendment literature takes the Supreme Court to task for 
not applying the probable cause and warrant requirements more broadly. See, e.g., Craig M. 
Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468 (1985); Silas J. Was-
serstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 257 (1984). 
House searches are the primary locus of the probable cause and warrant requirements -
indeed, house searches are almost the only searches left in which both those requirements 
apply. See Craig M. Bradley, The Court's "1Wo Model" Approach to the Fourth Amendment: 
Carpe Diem/, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1993) [hereinafter Bradley, Carpe Diem!j. 
Therefore, this criticism amounts to an argument that house searches should be the model for 
all of Fourth Amendment law. 
Note too that almost all Fourth Amendment literature criticizes the Court for protecting 
privacy too little. 1bis is one of the major themes of Professor LaFave's treatise. See, e.g., 1 
LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 2.4(a) (open fields doctrine); 1 id. § 2.6(c) (1987 & Supp. 1995) 
(searches of garbage left for pickup); 3 id. § 7.2(c) (1987 & Supp. 1995) (automobile 
searches); 4 id. § 10.11 (1987 & Supp. 1995) (searches of public school students). It is also a 
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larger and more serious conflict would appear: the different consti-
tutional treatment of privacy in the criminal and civil spheres. 
There is little point to resolving the smaller conflict unless the 
larger on~ can be resolved as well. Indeed, the two may be closely 
related. A major source of the conflicts within criminal procedure 
may be the effort to avoid the more basic difficulty - the seeming 
incompatibility of the modem administrative state and serious pro-
tection for informational privacy. 
Perhaps that incompatibility should be resolved by protecting 
privacy more, across the board. But this solution would involve a 
huge cost to the current constitutional order; it would require revi-
siting the accommodation between law and politics that has served 
for the past fifty years. Nor is this just a matter of costs. The fact 
that informational privacy seems to count for so little outside crimi-
nal investigation may suggest that it counts for little in our collec-
tive preferences. The law's tolerance of privacy harms inflicted by 
the regulatory state, inflicted on even (especially?) the politically 
powerful, implies that keeping secrets from the government is not 
as important a value as Fourth and Fifth Amendment rhetoric sug-
gests. If we could start over, perhaps privacy would not receive 
constitutional protection anywhere. The anomaly may be criminal 
procedure, not the regulatory state. 
II. Pruv ACY'S PROBLEM AND FOURTH AND 
FIFTH AMENDMENT LAW 
Protecting people's ability to keep secrets tends to limit the gov-
ernment's substantive power. The law of criminal procedure has 
long sought to protect people's ability to keep secrets, at least from 
the government. It follows that one of two things must be, and 
must have been, true: (i) criminal procedure must serve as a surro-
gate for substantive due process - a source of substantive limits on 
government power - or (ii) criminal procedure must be filled with 
arbitrary boundaries or rules that limit privacy protection in order 
theme of the literature attacking limits on the scope of the warrant requirement. See, e.g., 
Bradley, Carpe Diem/, supra; Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 
35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 197 {1993); Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth 
Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1 {1991). Finally, it is the main theme of the literature criti· 
cizing the Court's "reasonable expectation of privacy" doctrine. See sources cited infra note 
144. In all this literature the standard rule for house searches - the requirement that the 
police have both probable cause and a warrant in order to justify the search - is taken, 
either implicitly or explicitly, as the model to which the law should ordinarily conform. In 
that sense, virtually all of the vast literature on the Fourth Amendment attacks the hypocrisy 
mentioned in the text - the gap between the way privacy is protected in the home and the 
way it is protected on the street. 
March 1995] Privacy's Problem 1049 
also to limit its substantive effects. The first was probably true of 
the law a century ago, when the Supreme Court first linked privacy 
with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The second is emphatically 
true of the law today .. 
A. Privacy Protection in the Lochner Era10s 
In Boyd v. United States, 106 the government sought to compel a 
merchant to produce invoices on twenty-nine cases of imported 
glass. The government claimed that Boyd had lied about the con-
tents of the shipments in order to evade taxes. The proceeding was 
civil and in rem; the penalty sought was forfeiture of the glass.107 
The Supreme Court held that the subpoena for the invoices vio-
lated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. (The Court read the two 
amendments to mean essentially the same thing.10s) Its broad hold-
ing appeared to rule out both searches and subpoenas for docu-
ments, at least if the purpose of the subpoena was to use the 
documents as evidence.109 Justice Bradley's majority opinion con-
tained ringing declarations of the importance of constitutionally 
protecting "the privacies of life" and the centrality of that mission 
to Fourth and Fifth Amendment law; the opinion also linked that 
mission to the protection of property rights.110 Interestingly, Brad-
105. For a more extended version of the discussion in this subsection, see William J. 
Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE LJ. (forthcoming Nov. 
1995). 
106. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
107. 116 U.S. at 617-18. 
108. Hence the famous line, "[i]n this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run al-
most into each other." 116 U.S. at 630. Later in its opinion the Court elaborated on the 
relationship: 
We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two amendments. They 
throw great light on each other. For the "unreasonable searches and seizures" con-
demned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compel-
ling a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the 
F'"tfth Amendment, and compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a witness against 
himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as 
to what is an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
116 U.S. at 633. 
109. The thrust of the majority opinion was to analogize the subpoena in Boyd to the 
search and seizure of John Entick's books and papers in the famous eighteenth-century case, 
Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765) (discussed in 116 U.S. at 626-30). Thus, 
Boyd's bar on the subpoena necessarily included a bar on a search for documents. Signifi-
cantly, nothing in the Court's opinion suggests that subpoenas like the one in Boyd are per-
missible given a good enough government justification. The bar was absolute, not 
conditional. 
110. 
The principles laid down in [ Entick v. Carrington] affect the very essence of constitu-
tional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then 
before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the 
part of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's home and the priva-
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ley's opinion found it rather easy to apply the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments in the civil case at hand. The Court concluded that all 
suits for "penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission of 
offences against the law, are of ... quasi-criminal nature,"111 which 
was enough to bring them within the spirit of the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, though not within the amendments' "literal 
terms. "112 
Today, most constitutional law scholars ignore Boyd. Those 
who teach and write about criminal procedure, on the other hand, 
tend to treat the case as an icon. Its unfortunate 1inking of privacy 
and property aside, Boyd is conventionally seen as the Miranda of 
its day, a criminal procedure case that courageously protected the 
rights (particularly the privacy rights) of individuals against the gov-
ernment. Its passing - essentially nothing in Boyd's holding is 
good law anymore - is mourned as a sign of citizens' diminished 
protection against an overly aggressive criminal justice system.113 
Judging from the appellate case law of its day, however, Boyd 
was more important for its effect on regulatory legislation than for 
its impact on criminal justice. In the decades following the Court's 
decision, few ordinary criminal investigations led to Boyd-type 
claims, either in the form of challenges to subpoenas or as trespass 
actions against officers.114 On the other hand, regulatory cases 
were common. In a number of bankruptcy cases, the debtor sought 
to avoid certain kinds of compelled disclosure.115 Antitrust cases 
began to crop up following the Sherman Act in 1890, with defend-
ants raising Fifth Amendment objections to subpoenas or question-
ing.116 Railroad regulation disputes were especially numerous and 
especially high-profile, with corporate officials striving to avoid tes-
cies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that 
constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of 
personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never been 
forfeited by his conviction of some public offence •... 
116 U.S. at 630. 
111. 116 U.S. at 634. 
112. 116 U.S. at 633. 
113. For the modem view of Boyd, see Robert S. Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: Self· 
Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 21 UCLA L. REV. 343. (1979); Eric 
Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REv. 869 (1985); and 
Note, The Life and Tunes of Boyd v. United States (1886-1976), 16 MICH. L. REv. 184 {1977). 
114. Among reported cases, the sole exceptions are fraud cases. See, e.g., United States 
v. National Lead Co., 75 F. 94 (C.C.D.N.J. 1896) (refusing to force a defendant to produce his 
books and records in a civil proceeding to recover funds fraudulently obtained). 
115. See supra note 60. 
116. The most famous of these was Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). 
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tifying or producing documents in ICC proceedings.117 Indeed, 
both of the 1890s decisions that defined Fifth Amendment immu-
nity doctrine for the next seventy-five years, Counselman v. Hitch-
cock11B and Brown v. Walker, 119 were railroad regulation disputes. 
These cases were not all resolved in the defendants' favor; 
courts found ways to evade Boyd's seemingly absolute protec-
tion.120 But defendants won often ~mough, and the ability to com-
pel people to testify and turn over records was important enough, 
that some turn-of-the-century judges and Justices openly worried 
that regulation would be impossible if Boyd's privacy protection 
were given its full scope.121 
The concern was well founded. Consider Boyle v. Smithman, 122 
an 1892 Pennsylvania case that adopted Boyd-style reasoning, 
though without citing Boyd, as the relevant law was state rather 
than federal. Pennsylvania had a statute requiring persons in the 
business of transporting and storing oil to keep records of how 
much oil they had on hand, where it was stored, and so forth. 
Boyle, a newspaper publisher, tried to force Smithman, an oil 
merchant, to produce the required records.123 The court might 
have ruled that only the government was entitled to enforce the 
statute, but instead it found for Smithman on a much broader 
ground: forcing Smithman to produce the relevant records would 
117. Several of the railroad cases made it to the Supreme Court. See Interstate Com-
merce Commn. v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25 (1904); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Interstate 
Commerce Commn. v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 
(1892). These cases constitute the bulk of the Court's Fourth and Fifth Amendment case law 
in the two decades after Boyd. 
118. 142 U.S. 547 (1892). 
119. 161 U.S. 591 (1896). 
120. For example, in In re Harris, 164 F. 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1908), the court held that the 
debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding should tum over his books and papers to the trustee, and 
if the government ever wished to use them as evidence in a criminal case, the debtor could 
decide whether to invoke his privilege. 164 F. at 294. Harris makes an interesting pair with 
In re Tracy & Co., 177 F. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1910), in which the recently appointed Judge Learned 
Hand ruled that when the debtor already had turned over his books to the trustee, he had 
thereby waived any privilege claim he might make. 
121. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906) (noting that antitrust regulation would be 
impossible if Boyd's protection applied to corporations); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. at 610 
{"If ••• witnesses standing in Brown's position were at liberty to set up an immunity from 
testifying, the enforcement of the Interstate Commerce law or other analogous acts .•• would 
become impossible, since it is only from the mouths of those having knowledge of the inhib· 
ited contracts that the facts can be ascertained."); United States v. Price, 96 F. 960, 962 (D. 
Ky. 1899) (restricting the scope of defendant's Fifth Amendment immunity under the Inter-
state Commerce Act, and noting that if immunity were not so restricted, defendants would 
find it easy to immunize themselves for wrongdoing by getting themselves investigated for 
ICA violations). 
122. 23 A. 397 {Pa. 1892). 
123. 23 A. at 397. 
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violate the privilege against self-incrimination because the statute 
specified penalties for any defaults in record-keeping.124 In other 
words, Smithman could not be compelled to disclose his records 
because the records themselves might be inadequate, and if they 
were, Smithman might have to pay a fine. This holding apparently 
applied no matter what the nature of the proceeding or who asked 
for the records. The documents in question were papers, they were 
therefore private, they belonged to Smithman, and their disclosure 
might subject him to regulatory penalties. That was that. 
Boyle shows just what Boyd might have meant for the emerging 
regulatory state. If people could not be forced to disclose records 
because they may have violated a record-keeping requirement, the 
government could not have record-keeping requirements, or at 
least not meaningful ones. If requiring the keeping of records was 
impermissible, a good deal of regulation would be, as a practical 
matter, impermissible as well. Meanwhile, more direct disclosure 
- asking someone to turn over documents in order to show 
whether the suspect had violated some conduct regulation - was 
barred by Boyd itself. Nor could the government get around this 
restriction by searching for the documents instead of issuing a sub-
poena, because Boyd treated searches and subpoenas the same. 
Compelling oral testimony could not work because it would violate 
the privilege against self-incrimination. People like Boyd and 
Smithman were, potentially, immune from a great deal of com-
pelled disclosure, and consequently exempt from a great deal of 
government regulation. 
Had the cases continued along this path, Boyd might have come 
to play much the same role in constitutional law, and perhaps the 
same villain's role in constitutional theory, that Lochner v. New 
York125 and its ilk came to play. Government regulation required 
lots of information, and Boyd came dangerously close to giving reg-
ulated actors a blanket entitlement to nondisclosure. It is hard to 
see how modem health, safety, environmental, or economic regula-
tion would be possible in such a regime. 
As it happened, the cases did not continue along Boyd's path. 
Beginning in the first decade of this century, Boyd was effectively 
cabined, so much so that its implications for the world outside crim-
inal justice have been largely forgotten. Hale v. Henkel126 held that 
124. 23 A. at 398. 
125. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
126. 201 U.S. 43 (1906). 
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corporations have no privilege against self-incrimination and re-
ceive only slight protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.121 Marron v. United States128 held that instrumentalities of 
crime could be seized without violating the Fourth or Fifth Amend-
ments, and also that documents could be instrumentalities.1w Sha-
piro v. United States130 held that the privilege was not violated by 
asking someone to produce "required records" - meaning any 
records that the government ordered him to keep - no matter how 
incriminating the records' contents might be. These cases left Boyd 
largely inapplicable to the burgeoning world of government regula-
tion. The records in Boyd itself were probably instrumentalities 
under Marron, 131 and the documents sought in the various ICC 
cases of the 1890s might well have been judged "required records" 
by the standards used a half-century later. 
The Court did not explain its position in these cases in privacy 
terms. By and large, it justified the outcomes by political necessity. 
Hale, which arose out of a grand jury investigation of antitrust vio-
lations, is the clearest example. The argument for a corporate privi-
lege was strong: Wigmore, then the foremost expert on the 
privilege's scope and meaning, thought it applied to corporations as 
it did to individuals.132 That was the position the Court had taken 
with respect to the Due Process Clause, 133 and like that clause the 
Fifth Amendment privilege applied to "any person." Moreover, the 
privacy interest in corporate documents was at least as plausible as 
Boyd's privacy interest in his invoices. Even if a corporation could 
not "feel" privacy intrusions, its shareholders and employees could; 
as with due process claims, corporate assertion of the privilege 
against self-incrimination was a way of protecting the flesh-and-
blood people whose money and labor made the corporation run. 
Hale rejected all these arguments in a peremptory paragraph, stat-
127. 201 U.S. at 69-70, 76. 
128. 275 U.S. 192 (1927). 
129. 275 U.S. at 198-99. Marron all but nullified the decision in Gouled v. United States, 
255 U.S. 298 (1921), which arguably broadened Boyd to apply to all searches for evidence, 
not merely those that involved testimony or documents. See Note, supra note 113, at 189-95. 
130. 335 U.S. 1 (1948). 
131. The records at issue in Boyd were invoices, and the alleged wrong was misrepresen-
tation for the purpose of evading import taxes on shipments of plate glass. See supra note 7. 
The invoices were necessary to the commission of the wrong, which would seem to bring 
them within Marron's scope 
132. 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN 1'RIALs AT 
CoMMoN LAW§ 2259, at 3116 (1904) (calling the issue "plain"). 
133. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
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ing that "the privilege claimed would practically nullify" the Sher-
man Act.134 
In other words, Boyd-style privacy protection was not compati-
ble with activist government, because government cannot be very 
activist if it cannot force people to tell it things. Cases like Hale 
resolved the conflict by yielding ground - preserving privacy pro-
tection, but only within boundaries that themselves had nothing 
whatever to do with privacy. Privacy's substantive shadow was kept 
within acceptable bounds, but only by fiat. 
B. Privacy Protection Today 
Part of the problem with Fourth and Fifth Amendment law at 
the turn of this century stemmed from the absolute nature of 
Boyd's protection. Under Boyd, wherever the Constitution pro-
tected privacy, the state simply could not go; the concept of balanc-
ing seems to have been foreign to the constitutional culture.135 
Today, of course, balancing plays a central role in Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment law. All of Fourth Amendment law is conventionally 
said to represent a balance between law enforcement needs and in-
dividual interests, and the balancing is done explicitly in particular 
cases.136 Balancing is less pervasive in Fifth Amendment law1 but 
there too the courts sometimes weigh the government's regulatory 
needs against individual interests in nondisclosure, as in the "re-
quired records" cases spawned by Shapiro. 131 The advent of bal-
ancing reduces Boyd's substantive bite because it allows courts to 
take account of the government's interest in regulating. Were the 
Hale issue to arise for the first time today, the Court might reason 
that society has a strong interest in antitrust enforcement and that 
134. 
As the combination or conspiracies provided against by the Sherman Anti 'Ii:ust Act can 
ordinarily be proved only by the testimony of parties thereto, in the person of their 
agents or employes, the privilege claimed would practically nullify the whole act of Con-
gress. Of what use would it be for the legislature to declare these combinations unlawful 
if the judicial power may close the door of access to every available source of informa-
tion upon the subject? 
201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906). This quotation follows a passage that nicely anticipates Braswell v. 
United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988), by raising the specter of corporate agents invoking the 
privilege to protect other agents or their corporate principal. 201 U.S. at 69-70; see also supra 
text accompanying notes 72-75 {discussing Braswell). 
135. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE 
L.J. 943, 948-52 (1987). 
136. See, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451-55 (1990); Skinner 
v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 619-21 (1989). 
137. 335 U.S. 1 {1948). See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 458 {1971) (Harlan, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Bernard D. Meltzer, Privileges Against Self-Incrimination and 
the Hit-and-Run Opinions, 1971 SUP. Cr. REV. 1, 16-25. 
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such enforcement would not be possible in a world where corpora-
tions or their officers could claim the privilege with respect to cor-
porate documents. Privacy would be protected, but conditionally. 
Making the protection conditional, however, cannot solve the 
problem. A police officer must have probable cause or consent 
before he may inspect the trunk of my car for drugs. But the gov-
ernment can force me to disclose pretty much anything it wishes on 
my tax forms. Consistent privacy protection, even if subject to in-
terest balancing, could not reach these results. The lesson seems 
clear. Any attempt to give the same weight to individuals' interest 
in keeping the government from seeing things, across the board, 
must end in one of two ways: either a great deal of ordinary gov-
ernment activity must be subject to searching judicial review, or pri-
vacy-based restrictions on police searches must be drastically 
reduced. Neither alternative seems palatable. 
So the law has followed the path Hale marked out: abandon 
privacy where it might create difficulties outside ordinary criminal 
procedure. The result is a body of Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
law filled with strange twists and turns. Consider three examples: 
the law that defines what a "search" is, the cases that deal with 
searches by government officials other than the police, and the doc-
trines that regulate the use of subpoenas. 
The definition of search matters a great deal because the Fourth 
Amendment forbids only "unreasonable searches and seizures." 
Given the laxity of nonconstitutional regulation, if a given police 
tactic is neither a search nor a seizure, it is probably unregulated by 
any law. The definition seems initially to take careful account of 
privacy interests: a search is anything that invades a "reasonable 
expectation of privacy." According to the cases, this standard 
means that a search has taken place whenever a police officer looks 
somewhere that is both hidden from the public and likely to contain 
the sorts of things that many people would prefer be kept 
private.138 
That sounds sensible enough. But many of the cases contradict 
the formula. According to the Supreme Court, the following police 
tactics do not infringe a "reasonable expectation of privacy" and so 
are constitutionally unregulated: police overflights of private prop-
erty, 139 searches of garbage after it has been left for pickup, 140 "pen 
138. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. 
139. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
140. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
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registers" that record phone numbers that individuals have called 
from their own homes,141 and requests made to banks or other fi-
nancial institutions for individual customers' financial records.142 
On the other hand, if a police officer walks up to a suspect who is 
holding a rolled-up paper bag, the officer cannot open the bag un-
less he has probable cause to believe it contains evidence of crime, 
probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime, or 
reasonable grounds for suspecting the bag contains a weapon.143 In 
terms of ordinary privacy expectations and preferences, these re-
sults are strange. Contraband aside, the paper bag is likely to con-
tain nothing more private than a sandwich. Garbage contains a 
good deal more - tossed-out correspondence, for example. And it 
is hard to dispute the private nature of the times and targets of 
one's phone calls, not to mention the details of one's finances. The 
literature makes precisely this point: consistent privacy protection 
requires a much broader definition of Fourth Amendment searches 
than the Court has adopted.144 
There is a pattern to these cases. When the police gather infor-
mation in ways that involve neither a confrontation nor a trespass, 
they usually are exempt from Fourth Amendment regulation, no 
matter how private the information they seek. But when a police 
officer, acting as a police officer, confronts a citizen, the Fourth 
Amendment will apply to almost anything the officer examines: 
one famous case even deals with the search of a crumpled cigarette 
141. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
142. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
143. Opening the bag would unquestionably be a Fourth Amendment "search." E.g., 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (requiring probable cause but not a warrant to 
justify the search of a paper bag found in a car). The police could undertake such a search 
incident to a lawful arrest, but that in tum would require probable cause to justify the arrest. 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). If probable cause to arrest were based 
on the contents of the bag - for example, if the police had probable cause to believe the bag 
contained cocaine - that would justify both the arrest and the search. Alternatively, if the 
police had probable cause to believe the bag contained evidence but lacked probable cause 
to arrest (an unlikely scenario), they could seize and hold the bag while they applied for a 
warrant to search it. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (criticizing the 
government for not following this procedure). Fmally, if the police had reasonable grounds 
for suspecting that the bag contained a weapon, that would justify a brief search that would 
include the bag. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (authorizing frisks based on reasonable 
suspicion of the presence of a weapon); cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983} (authoriz-
ing Terry frisk that extended beyond the suspect's person and included the suspect's car). 
144. See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the 1Wenty-first Cen-
tury, 65 IND. LJ. 549 (1990); Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for 
Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REv. 583 (1989). For an interesting combination 
of this criticism with some empirical research into people's actual privacy preferences, see 
Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Au-
tonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized 
and Permitted by Society," 42 DuKE LJ. 727 (1993). 
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packet taken from a suspect's pocket.145 The difference does not 
make sense in privacy terms. It nevertheless accomplishes some-
thing important. It helps to keep search doctrine focused on what 
the police do in day-to-day criminal investigation, not on what the 
government does when gathering information for other purposes. 
It would be hard to explain, after all, why the police should be sub-
ject to serious Fourth Amendment constraints when seeking finan-
cial records from banks but other government officials should be 
able to see a wide range of financial records on request. So too, 
inspecting suspects' garbage is much more like the sort of thing en-
vironmental regulators do than is a typical street stop. Focusing on 
coercive police-citizen interactions helps keep Fourth Amendment 
privacy protection in its place. 
The second example concerns non-police searches. Environ-
mental regulators need to go on targets' land to take soil samples. 
OSHA inspectors need to look around places of business. Building 
code inspections sometimes require entry into private homes. Gov-
ernment employers sometimes want to search employees' desks or 
file cabinets, and school principals sometimes search students' lock-
ers. All these things are unquestionably Fourth Amendment 
"searches," even given the strange set of cases discussed in the pre-
ceding paragraphs. 
These practices are not, however, subject to ordinary Fourth 
Amendment standards. The Supreme Court says that the ordinary 
rules, such as the probable cause standard and the warrant require-
ment, do not apply when the government has "special needs" at 
stake.146 Oddly enough, these special needs do not include the 
need to solve or prevent serious crimes. They do include the need 
to investigate schoo1141 or employee misconduct,148 the need to run 
a regulatory inspection system,149 and the like. And when special 
needs are found, the working Fourth Amendment rule seems to be 
something like a shock-the-conscience test: unless the government 
behavior was outrageous, the search is constitutionally reason-
145. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); see supra note 14 (discussing 
Robinson). 
146. The phrase comes from New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring). It has since become a staple of Supreme Court opinions in nontraditional 
Fourth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, '073-74 (19'07) (search 
of probationer); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (19'07) (search of automobile junk-
yard}; O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (19'07) (plurality opinion) (search of govern-
ment employee's office}. 
147. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) .. 
148. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
149. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (19'07). 
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able.150 Indeed, searches are almost automatically "reasonable" 
when conducted for some reason other than enforcing the criminal 
law. This result is perverse in privacy terms: the privacy interest in 
a student's purse does not depend on whether a school principal or 
a police officer is searching it, and the countervailing government 
interest is probably stronger in the latter case. 
Yet the Court seems to sense in these cases that a different re-
sult would lead to something very much like open-ended substan-
tive review. New York v. Burger151 offers a nice example of the 
problem. In that case the Court sustained a statute152 that allowed 
the police to inspect the records and premises of automobile junk-
yards (presumably in order to prevent them from buying and dis-
mantling stolen cars).153 The statute required neither probable 
cause nor reasonable suspicion; inspections were undertaken at the 
discretion of the police. Suppose the case had come out differently 
- suppose the Court had required, as a prerequisite to searching, 
that the officer have probable cause to believe that the junkyard 
either had violated the law or contained evidence of a violation. 
The state could easily react by enacting a set of detailed regulations 
covering every aspect of the junkyarp's business, including the 
kinds of buildings and tools that can be used, the number of em-
ployees allowed, the location and type of fences surrounding the 
property, the number of cars that can be stored, and so forth -
regulations the state need not have any intention of really enforc-
ing. If the regulations were detailed enough and if the police did 
not systematically enforce them, all junkyards would be violating 
some rule at all times, probable cause would thus be easy to estab-
lish, and the police could search whenever they pleased - the same 
result as under the statute the Court upheld in Burger. The only 
way to avoid this result, the only way to keep the state from evading 
the limits on police authority, would be to limit the kinds of regula-
tions the state could enact.154 The Court's decision in Burger avoids 
150. See Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. 
REv. 1, 43 (1991) (noting that "reasonableness" in these cases seems to mean not only less 
than probable cause but also less than reasonable suspicion); William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bar-
gains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REv. 553, 554 (1992) 
(equating the standard with rational-basis review in constitutional cases). 
151. 482 U.S. 691 (1987). 
152. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 415-a{5) {McKinney 1986). 
153. 482 U.S. at 712. 
154. See Stuntz, supra note 150, at 583-85. The system could avoid this box by limiting 
the discretion of the police, but that is a terribly difficult business - one reason why police 
and prosecutorial discretion have been largely exempt from legal regulation. Precisely this 
choice arose in the cases invalidating vagrancy and loitering laws. A large part of the prob-
lem in those cases was connected with the way official discretion was being exercised. See 
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this problem by treating the junkyard owner's privacy interest as of 
no account. Once again, the law sets a boundary line, protects pri-
vacy on one side of the line, and ignores it on the other. The result 
is to limit criminal procedure's substantive effect. 
The third and clearest example of this phenomenon is one that 
today is taken for granted: the overturning of Boyd's rule barring 
government inspection of private papers. Beginning with Fisher v. 
United States155 in 1976, the Court did away with the Fifth Amend-
ment bar on subpoenas for some sorts of documents. Under Fisher, 
suspects may refuse to turn over potentially incriminating docu-
ments only if the act of production would incriminate them; the in-
criminating effect of the documents themselves is not enough.156 
Fisher's rule had two effects. First, searches for documents became 
permissible if backed up by probable cause and, where necessary, a 
warrant. The absolute bar of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion no longer applied.157 Second, Fisher left subpoenas for docu-
ments virtually unrestricted. As it stands now, subpoenas are 
subject only to the twin requirements that the material sought be 
relevant to a legitimate investigation and that compliance with the 
subpoena not be too burdensome.158 These requirements are, in 
practice, lax. Thus, in the century since Boyd we have gone from 
absolute protection of one's papers to almost no protection. 
This change is senseless in privacy terms: as Boyd recognized, 
papers are among one's most private possessions. But the alterna-
tive would have a significant effect on the administrative state, 
given the widespread reliance of regulatory agencies on the sub-
poena power. Indeed, prior to Fisher, the Boyd rule was tolerable 
only because Hale denied Fifth Amendment protection to corpora-
tions and (usually) corporate officers, while Shapiro v. United 
States159 and its progeny denied such protection to any records the 
Jeffries, supra note 50, at 215-18. The system in effect chose substantive review by invalidat-
ing the statutes. 
155. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
156. 425 U.S. at 408-13. 
157. This effect was confirmed by Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). In Andre-
sen, decided two months after Fisher, the Court upheld the search and seizure of some files in 
an attorney's office, citing Fisher repeatedly for the proposition that the privilege against self-
incrimination did not bar the search. 427 U.S. at 472-77. 
158. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. For the Fourth Amendment limits on 
subpoenas, see United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973). Dionisio does not wholly rule 
out Fourth Amendment challenges to grand jury subpoenas, but it does limit those challenges 
to subpoenas that are "too sweeping in [their] terms 'to be regarded as reasonable.' " 410 
U.S. at 11 (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906)). 
159. 335 U.S. 1 (1948). 
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government required individuals to keep. Fisher merely finished 
the job that Hale and Shapiro started. 
The common theme in these examples seems obvious. Where 
privacy protection 'would lead most directly to substantive con-
straint on government regulation, the law has abandoned all pre-
tense of protecting privacy. That practice has worked, after a 
fashion: no one today worries about the substantive implications of 
search and seizure or self-incrimination law. But it leaves huge dis-
continuities within Fourth and Fifth Amendment doctrine - gaps 
that cannot be bridged within the existing legal framework. 
The reason for these discontinuities also seems obvious. The 
law is based on a principle - serious protection of informational 
privacy - that has implications we cannot tolerate. The substan-
tive consequences of privacy protection may have been acceptable 
in Boyd's era (though not for long even then), but they are not 
acceptable now. Perhaps it is time to reconsider the protection. 
m. RETinNKING PRIVACY PRoTECTioN 
Criminal procedure's focus on privacy has costs that go beyond 
the lack of analytic tidiness. The cost is not that the police are over-
regulated, though in some respects they are. On the contrary, the 
exaltation of privacy in criminal procedure has left the police under-
regulated, by focusing attention on the least serious injuries that 
police misconduct can cause. To understand why, one must look at 
the differences between the sorts of police investigation that in-
fringe on privacy the most and the police tactics that are the most 
common subjects of constitutional regulation. 
A. House Searches and Street Stops 
The law of criminal procedure has never done a good job of 
defining its goals with any precision. Instead, the doctrine has 
seemed to flow out of a few paradigmatic problems - as if to say, 
whatever else we want to do, we surely want to prevent this - leav-
ing courts to analogize new cases to the familiar paradigms. The 
dominant paradigm in search and seizure law has always been the 
ransacking of a private home, with an emphasis on rummaging 
around through the homeowner's books and papers. This image fits 
the pair of eighteenth-century cases that had the most to do with 
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the Fourth Amendment's creation:160 in both Entick v. Car-
rington161 and Wilkes v. Wood, 162 the King's agents searched the 
plaintiff's home and carted off his books and papers for inspection. 
It also fits Mapp v. Ohio,163 the most famous Fourth Amendment 
case of this century: the officers in Mapp did a top-to-bottom 
search of a boarding house, and the evidence they found consisted 
of a few dirty books that belonged to the house's owner.164 
Focusing on cases like Entick and Wilkes and Mapp, one can see 
why courts would use Fourth Amendment law to protect informa-
tional privacy. And protecting privacy in the home casts a smaller 
substantive shadow than protecting privacy in glove compartments 
or jacket pockets. The regulatory state does not usually snoop 
around in people's bedrooms, and the privacy content of what po-
lice can find there is plausibly distinguishable from the kinds of in-
formation the state seeks for regulatory purposes. The same is true 
for electronic eavesdropping, another police tactic that has gener-
ated more than its share of leading cases. Katz v. United States, 165 
the case that spawned the "reasonable expectation of privacy" doc-
trine, was a wiretapping case, and the key opinion in that case be-
gins by analogizing the wiretap of a telephone booth to the search 
of a home.166 So too, Justice Brandeis's famous dissent in Olmstead 
v. United States161 argued for a ban on warrantless electronic eaves-
dropping by emphasizing the interest in privacy and by analogizing 
the practice to house searches.168 In these cases the house search 
paradigm seems to work. It is no surprise that when officers rum-
mage through suspects' dresser drawers, read their correspondence, 
or listen to their conversations, courts care deeply about individu-
als' ability to keep some aspects of their lives secret from the 
government. 
160. See Amar, supra note 5, at 1176-77 & n.208; see also NELSON B. LAssoN, THE His-
TORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTII AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CoNSTITU-
TION 43-50 (1937). 
161. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765). 
162. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763). 
163. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
164. 367 U.S. at 644-45. There is another common thread to Entick, Wilkes, and Mapp: 
all are free speech cases in disguise. Entick and Wilkes were both triggered by seditious libel 
charges. Mapp was litigated in the Supreme Court as a First Amendment case. See 367 U.S. 
at 672-73 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The crime charged - possession of obscene materials -
was later invalidated on First Amendment grounds. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
165. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
166. 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
167. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
168. 277 U.S. at 473-474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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But most of what the police do is quite different from house 
searches and wiretaps. Street encounters and car stops involve 
much less private disclosure than the kinds of searches in Mapp and 
Katz; they also involve other sorts of harm that may not be cap-
tured by the law's focus on informational privacy. And there are 
many, many more street encounters than searches of private homes. 
House searches turn out not to be so paradigmatic after all.169 
169. For most of our constitutional history, it made no difference whether house searches 
were representative of searches generally, because the law of criminal procedure all but ig-
nored contacts between police officers and citizens outside the home. Search incident to 
arrest doctrine made it easy for police to search anyone they could legitimately arrest, and 
old-style vagrancy and loitering laws made it easy to arrest almost anyone. See William O. 
Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE LJ. 1 (1960); Foote, supra note 50. 
Plus, before Mapp, the only remedy for illegal searches in most jurisdictions was a trespass 
action against the offending officer. Such suits were rarely a worthwhile response to street 
encounters. Even if it were otherwise, damages suits are not very valuable to the sorts of 
plaintiffs of whom juries disapprove, a characterization that probably fits most victims of 
illegal police behavior on the street. Finally, by the mid-twentieth century the police had 
good-faith immunity in damages suits, which, given the virtual absence of legal constraint, 
made establishing liability just about impossible. See David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Ac-
countability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. CoLO. L REv. 1, 47-55 (1972) (discuss-
ing the rise of government officials' good-faith immunity). Nor did the privilege against self-
incrimination make up for Fourth Amendment law's deficiencies. Before Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the privilege was inapplicable to police questioning. See Yale 
Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amend-
ment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1966) (criticizing that state of 
affairs). It is nothing short of astonishing how little the law of criminal procedure had to do 
with ordinary law enforcement on the streets. 
Then came the 1960s. The exclusionary rule made it possible for victims of police miscon-
duct to avoid hostile juries and provided an incentive to raise claims whenever evidence was 
found, not just in large-scale search cases. Equally important, vagrancy and loitering laws 
were invalidated on vagueness grounds, eliminating the de facto arrest power (together with 
its ancillary search authority) that officers had previously held. See Stuntz, supra note 150, at 
559-60 & nn.27-29. These changes made Fourth Amendment law, for the first time, impor-
tant not only to house searches but also to the mass of informal street encounters between 
police officers and suspects. 
One might have expected some serious rethinking of what the Fourth Amendment is 
about as the law established itself in this new, vast arena. But the house search paradigm has 
continued to hold sway. In the past generation, Fourth Amendment cases involving the po-
lice have been obsessed with two legal issues: whether a "search" has taken place, and if so, 
whether the police must get a warrant. The first issue is controlled by an analysis generated 
in a wiretapping case and modeled on the problem of house searches. See Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (making the comparison with house 
searches). Predictably, that analysis focuses on what the officer saw and what he knew when 
he saw it. This approach may capture the individual interests at stake when officers are 
rooting around in the bedroom closet, but it does less well when they are performing a pat-
down on the street. The warrant issue is also modeled on house searches, for which the 
warrant requirement is well-settled. In street encounters, requiring warrants would be im-
possible: warrants involv~ planning and delay, while most police-citizen encounters are un-
planned and require on-the-spot decisions. That is one reason why warrants are rarely 
required except for searches of private homes. Still, the fact that warrants have been such a 
persistent issue in other cases shows how much litigation has been shaped by the image of 
house searches. 
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Consider a typical 1990s Fourth Amendment case. In Fl.orida v. 
Jimeno, 170 a police officer pulled over the defendant's car, ostensi-
bly because of a minor traffic violation but actually because the of-
ficer suspected drug activity. The officer gave Jimeno a ticket, told 
him that the officer had reason to believe drugs were in the car, and 
asked permission to search. Jimeno said yes, and the officer found 
a brown paper bag on the floor of the car. The officer opened the 
bag, which contained a kilogram of cocaine.111 
Jimeno is like many, perhaps most, contemporary search and 
seizure cases. An officer approached a suspect with some suspicion 
but not enough to justify an arrest, and in the course of the encoun-
ter the officer uncovered information that did justify an arrest. The 
Supreme Court's focus in Jimeno is also typical. Both the majority 
opinion and the dissent concerned themselves solely with the ques-
tion whether Jimeno's consent to search the car included consent to 
the opening of the paper bag. In other words, all the Justices fo-
cused on the scope of the officer's search. The majority concluded 
that opening the bag was proper because the suspect made no ex-
ceptions when he gave consent to search the car.172 The dissent 
argued that opening the bag was impermissible because of the sup-
posedly heightened privacy interest in closed containers found in 
cars.113 
The Court's conclusion is hardly surprising. The dissenters' ar-
gument notwithstanding, the privacy interest at stake in Jimeno 
seems trivial. If Jimeno had been innocent, the paper bag would 
likely have contained nothing more personal than lunch. This is a 
far cry from house searches and wiretaps. If privacy is what the 
system is supposed to protect in cases of this sort, and if the house 
search paradigm governs, it is easy enough to conclude that the en-
counter with Jimeno was perfectly reasonable. 
Courts nearly always so conclude in cases of this sort. The usual 
doctrinal vehicle is consent. Nominally, a search is consensual if a 
reasonable person in the suspect's position would have felt free to 
decline the officer's request.174 Of course, if that standard were 
taken seriously in Jimeno, it is hard to imagine anyone concluding 
that the search in that case was consensual. A uniformed, armed 
police officer had just stopped Jimeno's car and told him he was 
170. 500 U.S. 248 {1991). 
171. 500 U.S. at 249-50. 
172. 500 U.S. at 251-52. 
173. 500 U.S. at 253-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
174. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 {1991). 
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suspected of drug trafficking. Not many people would say "no" to 
the police under those circumstances. After all, Jimeno was "con-
senting" to a search that he knew would uncover a kilogram of co-
caine. Either he was crazy or, more plausibly, he assumed he had 
no choice.175 As the Court's decision suggests, the real standard 
applied in cases of this sort is not the "reasonable person" test that 
courts cite but rather a kind of Jeopardy rule: if the officer puts his 
command in the form of a question, consent is deemed voluntary 
and the evidence comes in. 
This approach to consent is perfectly predictable given the law's 
focus. The privacy interest in Jimeno was small, and the officer was 
not actfug on any illegitimate motive. In any balance of law en-
forcement need and individual privacy interest, therefore, the bal-
ance tips strongly in the government's favor; pretty much any 
government interest will suffice. Bending the definition of consent 
to let the evidence in is a natural response. 
But privacy is not the primary interest at stake in cases of this 
sort. If Jimeno had not had drugs in the car, what would have both-
ered him most about the encounter with the police officer? Surely 
not the discovery of the contents of the paper bag. The real harm in 
a case like Jimeno arises from the indignity of being publicly singled 
out as a criminal suspect and the fear that flows from being targeted 
by uniformed, armed police officers. Street encounters are not like 
house searches. The harm flows not from the search but from the 
encounter. The question should not be whether the officer had the 
suspect's permission to look at something. Permission will always 
be more fictive than real anyway. Rather, the question should be 
whether the officer's behavior was too coercive given the reason for 
the encounter. It is not the reasonableness of looking in the paper 
bag that ought to matter; it is the reasonableness of treating Jimeno 
175. As the facts in Jimeno show, this point often holds true even when the suspect is 
explicitly told that he need not consent to the search. Jimeno was given such a warning, see 
500 U.S. at 249, but the officer also told him that if he did not consent the officer would seek 
a warrant to search the car. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3, Jimeno 
(No. 90-622) (citing the record of Jimeno's suppression hearing). On the facts then available 
to the officer, a warrant seemed implausible. See id. at 2 (noting that the officer's suspicion 
of drug activity was based on a snippet of an overheard conversation on a payphone). At 
least the officer must have thought so, since, under established Fourth Amendment law, he 
was free to search the car without a warrant if he had probable cause to believe drugs were 
inside. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Why, then, would the officer threaten 
to seek a warrant? The likeliest answer is that the officer wished to suggest (1) that if Jimeno 
refused consent to search, the car would probably be seized by the police pending a warrant 
application {the threat to seek a warrant would have made no sense if Jimeno could simply 
drive away), and (2) that in the end, the car would be searched with or without Jimeno's 
consent 
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like he was a probable drug courier. By focusing on privacy and 
information gathering, the law fails to engage the real issue. 
There is also a more serious problem. Consider the facts of a 
now-venerable Fourth Amendment case, Terry v. Ohio.176 Officer 
McFadden saw Terry and two friends walking back and forth in 
front of a downtown Cleveland store; McFadden thought the three 
men were planning a robbery. The officer walked over and asked 
them what they were doing. Terry mumbled a response. McFadden 
grabbed Terry, spun him around, and frisked him, finding a gun. 
Then McFadden told the men to go inside a nearby store, where 
they were ordered to spread their arms and legs against the wall.177 
Under current law, there were two key moments in this incident: 
the moment when Terry and his colleagues were no longer free to 
walk away, and the search of Terry's pockets for weapons. McFad-
den needed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the 
first178 and reasonable suspicion that weapons might be present to 
justify the second.179 Note that the standard for searching Terry's 
pockets is harder to meet than the standard for seizing him on the 
street. 
Yet if Terry had had no gun - if he had been doing nothing 
more than window shopping - what would he have thought was 
the most significant aspect of the encounter? Surely not the viola-
tion of the sanctity of his coat pockets. People do not usually carry 
things in their coat pockets because they are trying to conceal them; 
they do so because it is convenient. The most important aspect of 
this or any other street stop to an innocent suspect must be some 
combination of the stigmatizing nature of the encounter and the 
police officer's use of force. McFadden didn't just ask Terry to 
empty his pockets; McFadden grabbed him and spun him around. 
In one of the companion cases to Terry, the officer grabbed the sus-
pect by the shirt collar and frisked him at gunpoint;1so as in Terry 
176. 392 U.S. 1 {1968). 
177. 392 U.S. at 5-7. 
178. 392 U.S. at 27-28. Actually, the Terry Court did not take a clear stand on what was 
required to justify seizing Terry; the Court's opinion is dominated by its discussion of the 
search of Terry's pockets. See also 392 U.S. at 19 n.16 {leaving open precisely when Terry was 
first "seized"). Since Terry, the Court has made clear that the standard for a seizure of this 
sort is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 
{1985). 
179. 392 U.S. at 20-27. 
180. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union at 5-6, Peters v. New York, 389 U.S. 
950 {1967) (No. 74) in KURLAND & CASPER EDS., supra note 7, at 468-69. Note that the 
amount of force used in a Terry stop can escalate dramatically given any sign of resistance by 
the suspect - including such mild forms of resistance as asking the officer questions or 
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the stop and frisk were deemed reasonable.1s1 These aspects of the 
encounter harm innocent suspects. Yet stigma and police use of 
force, which are obviously at the heart of the Terry facts, play a 
surprisingly small role in Terry doctrine. If McFadden had dis-
creetly approached Terry and his friends, quietly telling them not to 
walk away and to empty their pockets, never laying a hand on them, 
behaving throughout in a way that called no attention to the en-
counter, it would have made no legal difference. Legally, the scope 
of the search matters more than the coerciveness of the encounter. 
Yet ordinary people in Terry's shoes must care most about the 
latter. 
McFadden's move was a very small instance of a kind of police 
behavior that happens all the time, often with a good deal more 
severity, and yet receives astonishingly little legal regulation: low-
level violence against suspects. Often the violence is reasonable. 
(In Terry, it probably was.) But that is not always the case. And 
surely police violence deserves as much regulation as finding out 
what was in Terry's jacket. 
The premise of current doctrine is otherwise. One who studies 
the law of criminal investigation cannot help wondering at the 
chasm between the mass of rules and regulations governing where 
the police can look and what they can touch when they look there, 
and the virtual absence of any constitutional constraint on when 
police can strike a suspect.182 Of course, looking in jacket pockets 
implicates the interest in keeping secrets, while grabbing suspects, 
spinning them around, and holding them at gunpoint does not. So 
at one level the law is easy to explain. It looks primarily to privacy, 
the backbone of Fourth Amendment doctrine. But in terms of ordi-
nary people's valuation of their own interests, the privacy interest is 
dwarfed by the interest in avoiding unnecessary violence or the un-
reasonable exercise of police coercion. All our talk about privacy 
may have had the effect of stunting constitutional conversation 
about those more serious problems. 
This disease infects even house search cases. Consider one 
more example: Anderson v. Creighton, 183 the leading case on the 
mildly objecting to being stopped. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABoVB nm 
LAW: POI.ICE AND TiiE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 101-03 {1993). 
181. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66 {1968). 
182. Compare, for example Professor LaFave's brief treatment of excessive force claims, 
see 3 LAFAVE, supra note 29, at 411-14, witb his treatment of warrantless searches of persons 
and personal effects, see 3 id. at 437-560. The latter is a relatively small slice of the law of 
searches. 
183. 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
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scope of police officers' qualified immunity from damages litiga-
tion. Officers entered the Creightons' home in search of Mrs. 
Creighton's brother, who, unbeknownst to the Creightons, was a 
suspect in an armed robbery. The statement of facts from the court 
of appeals opinion in the case bears quoting: 
Mr. Creighton asked the officers to put their guns away because 
his children were frightened, but the officers refused. Mrs. Creighton 
awoke to the shrieking of her children, and was confronted by an of-
ficer who pointed a shotgun at her. She allegedly observed the of-
ficers yelling at her three daughters to "sit their damn asses down and 
stop screaming." She asked the officer, "What the hell is going on?" 
The officer allegedly did not explain the situation and simply said to 
her, "Why don't you make your damn kids sit on the couch and make 
them shut up." 
One of the officers asked Mr. Creighton if he had a red and silver 
car. As Mr. Creighton led the officers downstairs to his garage, where 
his maroon Oldsmobile was parked, one of the officers punched him 
in the face, knocking him to the ground, and causing him to bleed 
from the mouth and forehead. Mr. Creighton alleges that he was at-
tempting to move past the officer to open the garage door when the 
officer panicked and hit him. The officer claims that Mr. Creighton 
attempted to grab his shotgun, even though Mr. Creighton was not a 
suspect in any crime and had no contraband in. his home or on his 
person. Shaunda, the Creightons' ten-year-old daughter, witnessed 
the assault and screamed for her mother to come help. She claims 
that one of the officers then hit her . 
. . . Mrs. Creighton's mother later brought Shaunda to the emer-
gency room at Children's Hospital for an arm injury caused by the 
officer's rough handling.184 
Mrs. Creighton's brother was not in the house. The Creightons 
sued, claiming that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. 
On the facts, the Creightons had two plausible Fourth Amend-
ment claims: (i) the police illegally entered their home, meaning 
that the police lacked either probable cause or exigent circum-
stances (the latter being necessary to excuse the failure to get a war-
rant), and (ii) the conduct of the police after they entered the 
Creightons' home was unreasonable - that is, whether or not the 
initiation of the search was permissible, the conduct of the search 
was not. The second claim seems much stronger than the first. Af-
ter all, the police were in pursuit of a fugitive and had at least some 
reason, though perhaps not enough, to think the fugitive might be 
184. Creighton v. City of St Paul, 766 F.2d 1269, 1270-71 (8th Cir. 1985), vacated sub 
nom. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). The court of appeals was reviewing a 
decision on defendants' motion for summary judgment, so these are the facts as viewed most 
favorably for the Creightons. 
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at the Creightons' home. But it is hard to see how the police could 
justify their behavior once inside if the Creightons' version of the 
facts is anywhere close to the truth. 
Yet every court that discussed the Creightons' Fourth Amend-
ment claim took for granted that the only possible challenge was to 
the officers' initial entry.185 In the end, the defendants won on sum-
mary judgment on the ground that reasonable police officers could 
well have believed that both probable cause and exigent circum-
stances were present.186 This posture is typical. In Professor 
LaFave's treatise on search and seizure, whole chapters are devoted 
to the doctrines limiting entry into a house and entry into different 
parts of a house once inside,187 but one finds almost no discussion 
of limits on the degree of force used in conducting an otherwise 
permissible search. 
That fits the larger pattern of Fourth Amendment law. A focus 
on privacy has led to a great deal of law - sometimes fairly protec-
tj.ve, sometimes not - about what police officers can see. The doc-
trine pays a good deal less attention to what police officers can do. 
This is part of the cost of a Fourth and Fifth Amendment culture 
that has worried too much about privacy and too little about every-
thing else. 
B. Solving Privacy's Problem 
There are signs that this state of affairs is changing, that police 
coercion is displacing privacy as a focus of attention in the law of 
criminal investigation. This change is a good thing; it should pro-
ceed. Yet the shift from privacy to coercion carries with it impor-
tant difficulties. A reoriented criminal procedure system will have 
to grapple with some major problems that the current regime man-
ages to suppress or ignore. 
The move away from privacy protection has proceeded quite far 
in Fifth Amendment law. A generation ago, Fifth Amendment law 
was as firmly anchored in privacy as Fourth Amendment law. 
Under Boyd, the Fifth Amendment protected physical evidence as 
well as ordinary testimony. The immunity required to overcome 
that protection was transactional,188 meaning that the protection 
185. See Anderson, 483 U.S. 635; Creighton, 166 F.2d 1269 (same case); Appendix to Peti· 
tion for C'..ertiorari at 23a-26a, Anderson (No. 85-1520). 
186. Creighton v. Anderson, 724 F. Supp. 654, 661 (D. Minn. 1989), affd., 922 F.2d 443 
{8th Cir. 1990). 
187. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 29, §§ 4.5, 4.8, 6.1-6.7. 
188. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). 
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was, as a practical matter, close to absolute. The law was pretty 
much where Boyd, Hale, and Shapiro left it - focused on privacy, 
but with the protection carefully bounded so as not to interfere too 
much with ordinary government operations. Justices talked about 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as belonging together, as pro-
tecting much the same thing.189 Today, physical evidence is unpro-
tected,190 immunity is narrower,191 and Fifth Amendment 
protection has generally shrunk. Coercion has come to the fore, 
and privacy has taken a back seat. 
Th.is trend is especially evident in police interrogation doctrine. 
At its inception, the rule of Miranda v. Arizona192 protected indi-
vidual privacy and autonomy. By warning suspects that they need 
not talk and could have legal assistance if they wished, and by plac-
ing a "heavy burden" on the government to show that these rights 
had been waived "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently,"193 Mi-
randa seemed to ensure that suspects would not make incriminating 
disclosures unless they chose - really chose - to do so. Language 
in Earl Warren's majority opinion suggested that the government 
was not allowed to "persuade, trick, or cajole [the suspect] out of 
exercising his constitutional rights."194 Miranda was thus of a piece 
189. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961) ("We find that, as to the Federal 
Government, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and, as to the States, the freedom from 
unconscionable invasions of privacy and the freedom from convictions based upon coerced 
confessions do enjoy an 'intimate relation' "); 367 U.S. at 661-66 (Black, J., concurring) Gusti-
fying the imposition of the exclusionary rule on the states in terms of the relationship be-
tween the Fourth and Fifth Amendments). 
190. See F!Sher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757 (1966). 
191. Under Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the government must immu-
nize both the compelled testimony and its fruits, but it need not immunize the entire transac-
tion that is the subject of the compelled testimony. This requirement is narrower than the 
transactional immunity rule of Counselman v. Hitchcock. As Akhil Amar and Renee Lettow 
demonstrate elsewhere in this issue, there is a plausible argument for narrowing the immu-
nity rule even further. See Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First 
Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857 (1995). 
192. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
193. 384 U.S. at 444, 475. 
194. 384 U.S. at 455. Not everyone would agree with this characterization of Miranda. In 
his fascinating article on the common threads that run through Brown v. Board of Education 
and Miranda, Louis Michael Seidman argues that the Court's decision was actually a move in 
favor of law enforcement. According to Seidman, Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 
(1964), and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), had paved the way for true free choice 
for suspects - no police station confessions without the presence of defense counsel, a rule 
which would presumably mean almost no police station confessions at all. See Seidman, 
supra note 5, at 733-36. In Miranda, he claims, the Court took a step back from this position, 
giving suspects formal protection through the famous warnings, while leaving the substance 
of the coercive atmosphere of the police station unchanged. Id. at 736-47. 
Seidman's argument is powerful, and it has strong echoes in current police interrogation 
doctrine. But if Miranda represented a backward step from Massiah and Escobedo, it was a 
small step. The fact that the Court went out of its way to condemn trickery as well as arm-
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with privacy-protective Fourth Amendment law - just as Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment law had been closely linked, and linked to 
privacy, ever since Boyd. 
But Miranda doctrine has moved along a path different from the 
one Warren's opinion mapped out. The use of undercover agents 
and other similarly deceptive tactics often do not count as "interro-
gation" and so are not subject to Miranda's restrictions.195 As for 
direct questioning, officers are indeed allowed to "persuade, trick, 
or cajole" suspects into talking, as long as suspects are given the 
requisite warnings and agree to talk. Taking advantage of suspects' 
ignorance, mistakes, and poor judgment is routinely permitted.196 
Aside from the famous Miranda warnings themselves, two key lim-
its on the police remain: if the suspect asks to stop the questioning, 
it must stop,197 and if he asks for a lawyer, questioning cannot start 
again except by the suspect's decision.198 This regime does a poor 
job of protecting the privacy and autonomy interests that Miranda 
sought to guard. It does a much better job of regulating police use 
of force. Suspects are allowed to decide when the pressure is too 
twisting, together with the "heavy burden" of showing waiver the Court placed on the gov· 
ernment, suggest that Miranda, when it was decided, represented something close to the 
"free choice" regime at which Massiah and Escobedo had hinted. Most importantly, no one 
could have known at the time that large numbers of ordinary suspects in ordinary criminal 
cases would actually agree to talk to police after being told that they did not have to (indeed, 
that they could have a state-paid lawyer if they wished). Miranda may not look so radical in 
hindsight, but I suspect it seemed radical in 1966. And it seemed radical in exactly the way 
that Boyd may have seemed radical eighty years before - it served to shield large amounts 
of information from government scrutiny by placing that information squarely in defendants' 
control. Miranda was, in short, a classic privacy- and autonomy-protective decision. 
195. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990); Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987). 
For an argument that the Warren Court would have reached the same result, at least with 
respect to electronic eavesdropping and undercover agents, see Yale Kamisar, The Warren 
Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-
Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in VINCENT BLASI ED., THE BURGER COURT: 
THE CoUNTER-REVOLUTION TIIAT WASN'T 62, 63-64 (1983). 
196. See, e.g., Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 
523 (1987); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). For a discussion of the deception-coer-
cion line that these cases draw, see \Vtlliam J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 
75 VA. L. REv. 761, 814-22 (1989). 
197. "If [an] individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during question· 
ing, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." Michigan v. Mosley, 423 
U.S. 96, 100 (1975) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74). Once a suspect has exercised his 
right to remain silent the police may resume questioning "after the passage of a significant 
period of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings," at least where the second inter· 
rogation concerns a different crime than the first. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106. 
198. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Once triggered, this protection is stun-
ningly broad. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S.146 (1990) (holding that after a suspect has 
invoked his right to counsel, the police may not reinitiate questioning even after suspect has 
met with an attorney); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) (holding that after a suspect 
has invoked his right to counsel, the police may not reinitiate questioning even about a differ· 
ent offense). 
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great by stopping the proceedings or asking for help, and, in theory 
anyway, their requests must be honored. These rules give the po-
lice some incentive to avoid the most coercive tactics, because those 
tactics will be among the ones most likely to cause the suspect to 
stop the questioning. The doctrine still has serious problems: for 
example, tentative requests for counsel are not honored, 199 which 
dilutes officers' incentive to avoid arm-twisting. But the law has 
moved in precisely the right direction, away from protecting the in-
terest in nondisclosure and toward protecting the interest in avoid-
ing unreasonable police coercion. 
Some developments in Fourth Amendment law might herald a 
similar change of focus. Recall the pattern in the "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy" cases. The cases increasingly look to whether 
there has been a coercive encounter between a police officer and a 
citizen. If there has, a "search" has probably taken place; if not, the 
Fourth Amendment probably does not apply.200 Given this pattern, 
street encounters may be underregulated, but at least they receive 
more attention than searches of suspects' garbage or flights over 
backyards. That is as it should be, for the interests at stake in street 
encounters go far beyond privacy. 
Yet the law has a long way to go. Cases like Jimeno need to be 
evaluated in terms of the coerciveness of the police officer's behav-
ior, not just in terms of what the officer saw and what he knew 
199. Compare Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (declining to give any effect 
to ambiguous requests for counsel) with Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The 
Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Inte"ogation, 103 YALE LJ. 259 {1993) (arguing that 
ambiguous requests are as far as many defendants will go toward invoking their Miranda 
rights). This nonprotection of ambiguous requests for counsel contrasts strangely with the 
overprotection of clear requests for counsel. See supra note 198. 
200. Virtually all the Supreme Court decisions in which no reasonable expectation of 
privacy was infringed also involve no police-citizen confrontation. See Florida v. Riley, 488 
U.S. 445 (1989) (officers flew over defendant's property); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 
35 {1988) (officers examined garbage left for pick-up); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 
(1987) (officers looked inside a deserted open-air barn); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 
(1984) (officers walked through a privately owned field); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 
276 (1983) (officers used a beeper to monitor automobile movements); Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735 (1979) (officers received phone numbers called by the defendant through use of 
a pen register); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 {1976) {officers obtained defendant's 
financial records from a bank). 
There are, of course, some exceptions to the pattern. Wiretaps are plainly searches, even 
though they often require no confrontation between a police officer and an individual. The 
same is true of surreptitious searches of houses. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 
{1984). But wiretaps and house searches aside, Fourth Amendment "searches" do tend 
strongly to involve some coercive confrontation with the police. 
There are other hints of a tum toward coercion in Fourth Amendment doctrine. In Wm-
ston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985), the Court held that surgery on the defendant to remove a 
bullet for evidentiary purposes would constitute an unreasonable search absent a demonstra-
tion of "compelling need." Though the Court talked about privacy interests in Winston, pri-
vacy here means the interest in avoiding a kind of physical violence. 
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when he saw it, and certainly not in terms of the scope of the sus-
pect's fictive consent. In cases like Anderson v. Creighton, courts 
need to pay attention to the behavior of police officers during the 
course of otherwise legitimate searches and not end the analysis af-
ter concluding that some search was authorized. Finally, courts 
need to worry much less than they now do about the privacy inter-
est in glove compartments and jacket pockets and brown paper 
bags. 
Three serious obstacles stand in the way of these changes. The 
first and most obvious is remedial. Suppression of illegally ob-
tained evidence, the primary tool for enforcing restrictions on the 
police, is well suited to rules about evidence gathering - rules that 
limit what the police can see. Suppression is less well suited to reg-
ulating police violence, because of the lack of a causal connection 
between unreasonable use of force and the discovery of incriminat-
ing evidence. {There was no evidence gathering in the Rodney 
King incident.) The existence of the exclusionary rule thus tends to 
reinforce Fourth Amendment law's emphasis on privacy. 
Yet though the exclusionary rule does tilt the system toward pri-
vacy, the tilt can be corrected, at least in part. A sensible system 
might say that when police officers behave as they allegedly did in 
Anderson v. Creighton, any evidence they find in the house should 
be suppressed.201 The causal connection between the police mis-
conduct and finding the evidence is convenient, but it need not be 
crucial.202 Meanwhile, in the mass of cases like Jimeno that use 
"consent" to justify the search, police coercion is causally connected 
to evidence gathering. Nothing inherent in the suppression remedy 
bars a court from asking out loud what some judges probably ask 
sotto voce: Did the officer have a good enough reason for singling 
out the suspect in this way and for using this degree of force? To 
put it another way, the exclusionary rule does not dictate the sub-
stantive content of Fourth Amendment law. Miranda doctrine illus-
trates the point. There, the law has moved sharply in the direction 
of regulating police coercion, and the exclusionary rule remains the 
chief enforcement tool. 
201. And the law should certainly provide protection for innocent victims of unreasona-
bly performed searches - that is, for people like the Creightons. 
202. The law already does so~ething similar with respect to arrest. When suspects are 
arrested without probable cause, the ordinary remedy is to suppress any incriminating evi-
dence found during or soon after the arrest. Doctrinally, this flows from the fact that so 
many searches are predicated on legal arrest. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 29, §§ S.2-.3, S.S. 
Functionany, this practice serves to deter wrongful arrests in roughly the same way that the 
suppression remedy could deter excessive force in carrying out house searches. 
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The remedial problem remains serious. There are some kinds of 
police violence that the exclusionary rule cannot touch - again, 
think of Rodney King. Other remedies such as damages actions 
and criminal punishment have their own problems.203 But none of 
these difficulties would prevent courts from paying more attention 
to coercion and less to privacy in cases like Terry and Jimeno and 
Creighton. 
A second obstacle is more troubling. It is hard to spell out just 
how much coercion is too much in cases like Jimeno, and it is hard 
to generate legal rules that tell officers how to conduct a house 
search like the one in Creighton. Extremely ambiguous law is prob-
ably unavoidable here; a rule structure governing police coercion 
and violence is probably not a realistic possibility. Police behavior 
in street encounters may not be susceptible to the Miranda solution: 
a body of clear rules that can plausibly protect the values at stake 
and be readily communicated to and understood by the police. 
Some sort of negligence or gross-negligence standard may well be 
the best the law can do.204 
Criminal procedure faced precisely this problem during the 
early years of the Warren Court. Before the 1960s, the chief federal 
constitutional constraints on the police came from the Due Process 
Clause.205 With respect to searches and seizures, due process 
barred anything that shocked the Court's conscience.206 With re-
spect to police interrogation, the law forbade the use of "involun-
tary" confessions;201 in practice, involuntariness meant anything 
produced by (once again) shocking police misconduct.2os These 
legal standards were hopelessly vague, and according to the conven-
203. The chief problem with both damages and criminal prosecution is overdeterrence. If 
the remedy is used often enough to deter police misconduct, it will likely deter some good 
police conduct as well. 
204. The reason for adopting a gross negligence standard is the problem that underlies 
qualified immunity: the risk of overdeterrence. See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GoVERN-
MENT: CmzEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 71-73 (1983). But qualified immunity 
may itself take care of that problem by requiring something akin to clear illegality as a pre-
condition to damages liability for constitutional violations. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U.S. 635 (1987). Thus, qualified immunity may mean that a constitutional negligence stan-
dard translates into a gross negligence standard for purposes of damages liability. 
205. Federal agents were still bound by the body of Fourth and Fifth Amendment rules 
that had evolved out of Boyd. 
206. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 
(1952). 
207. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
208. For a nice discussion of just how little the voluntariness standard constrained the 
police, see Kamisar, supra note 169, at 94-104. 
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tional wisdom of the time, their vagueness made them useless.209 
The police could not know what was prohibited, so they simply ig-
nored the law and did what they wanted, bearing the slight risk that 
later on some judge's conscience would be shocked. If this kind of 
uncertainty is the inevitable result of a legal regime that tries di-
rectly to address police coercion, that enterprise does not look 
promising. 
But the constitutional regime that the Warren Court rejected 
had more problems than its vagueness. Pre-1960s law was not only 
fuzzy, it was also extraordinarily lenient. Only truly egregious po-
lice conduct posed any risk of constitutional sanction. Given such 
leniency and given that what was truly egregious was never clear, it 
made perfect sense for police to ignore the governing legal stan-
dards. If essentially nothing is clearly illegal, and if most things are 
clearly legal, the governing standards are not likely to shape behav-
ior.210 One solution - the Warren Court's solution - was to in-
corporate the privacy value of Boyd, the value that was still the 
centerpiece of Fourth and Fifth Amendment law, into the Due Pro-
cess Clause and thereby enforce privacy-protective criminal proce-
dure rules against the states. Following that path allowed the Court 
to generate a detailed rule structure for criminal investigation, 
much of which still stands today. It also heightened the conflict be-
tween criminal procedure and the rest of the constitutional order 
and avoided doing much of anything about police violence. 
A better solution would be simply to make the standards 
tougher - to do the same thing the Court tried to do before the 
1960s but with less of a bias in favor of the police. Even a gross 
negligence standard for cases like Creighton would be a good deal 
tougher than the "shock the conscience" regime of the 1950s. 
Moreover, if leniency was as big a problem for 1950s law as was 
vagueness, tougher standards would shape police conduct. Many 
searches and seizures must be supported by probable cause, and 
probable cause is defined as a "fair probability," judged under all 
the circumstances.211 This is a classically vague standard. But it ap-
209. See id.; Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Crime and Confession, 79 HAR.v. L. REv. 21, 36-37 
(1965). This position led to many calls for "codes" of one sort or another to solve the police 
interrogation problem. See Paul M. Bator & James Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interroga-
tion and the Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 62 (1966); Arnold N. Enker & Sheldon H. Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. 
United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REv. 47, 84-91 (1964). 
210. This statement is true unless the penalty for illegal behavior is extremely high. The 
suppression remedy does not establish a very high penalty because it only forces the officer 
to disgorge the evidentiary gains from his misconduct. 
211. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-41 (1983). 
March 1995] Privacy's Problem 1075 
parently shapes behavior: a huge majority of searches pursuant to 
warrants find evidence listed in the warrant,212 suggesting that po-
lice officers and magistrates manage to apply the probable cause 
standard with some success. Case-by-case adjudication does, after 
all, send legal signals. The police are receptive to those signals be-
cause they must be: they are very frequent litigants. In short, a fair 
response to the concern with vagueness is that vague standards are 
indeed a problem, but they are still worth something and, in any 
event, are better than no standards at all. 
A third obstacle is more serious still, for it goes to basic choices 
about the way police operate on the streets. As anyone who reads a 
newspaper knows, we are in the midst of a revival of "community 
policing." What that term means is not entirely clear, but one cen-
tral characteristic is sustained personal contact between police of-
ficers and citizens outside the context of officers' response to 
reported crimes.213 The idea behind this movement is simple and 
powerful. Community policing is a response to the fact that over 
the past few decades, policing has become more reactive than it 
used to be. Officers are less likely to "walk a beat," more likely to 
patrol their territory in cars, and hence more likely to encounter 
citizens as suspects and crime victims rather than simply as citi-
zens.214 This development probably raises police efficiency if good 
law enforcement consists solely of solving crimes. Police in cars can 
get to the scene of a reported crime faster than officers on foot. But 
it may lower efficiency if it hampers officers' ability to stop crimes 
before they happen, perhaps by the judicious exercise of low-level 
force against potential wrongdoers - anything from brief street 
seizures to breaking up groups of troublemakers and forcing them 
to go home. Officers can more easily use these sorts of informal, 
fundamentally preventive tactics if they are regularly "making the 
212. See Donald A. Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE LJ. 906, 925 {1986) (noting that, 
according to a study of the warrant process sponsored by the National Center for State 
Courts, about 74-89% of the searches discover at least some of the evidence named in the 
warrant). 
213. See generally JEROME H. SKOLNICK & DAVID H. BAYLEY, THE NEW BLUE LINE: 
POLICE INNOVATION IN Soc AMERICAN CrrIEs {1986); Geoffrey P. Alpert & Roger G. Dun-
ham, Community Policing, 14 J. POLICE Scr. & ADMIN. 212 (1986); Mark Harrison Moore, 
Problem-solving and Community Policing, in 15 MODERN POLICING 99 (Michael Tonry & 
Norval Morris eds., 1992). To date, the legal literature has devoted surprisingly little atten-
tion to this revival - an unfortunate omission, as community policing has major implications 
for the shape of both criminal law and criminal procedure. For an interesting and balanced 
preliminary discussion, see Debra A. Livingston, Brutality in Blue: Community, Authority, 
and the Elusive Promise of Police Refonn, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1556, 1571-76 (1994) {book 
review). 
214. See, e.g., Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Police Organization in the TWentieth Century, in 15 
MODERN POLICING, supra note 213, at 51, 91-92. 
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rounds" on foot. Police cars create distance; they lead to a more 
detached, and hence more reactive, law enforcement style. 
If the advocates of community policing are right, the old way 
was better. It is worth asking, then, why it was abandoned. One 
answer bears strongly, and depressingly, on the law's ability to do a 
good job of regulating police use of force. Before the 1960s, the 
police could seize just about anyone on the street: vagrancy and 
loitering laws applied to almost any public behavior, so the police 
always had probable cause to arrest.21s When those laws were in-
validated in the late 1960s and early 1970s, street seizures immedi-
ately became a legal problem.216 In the absence of blanket 
authority to arrest, the police needed more specific grounds to jus-
tify ad hoc seizures on the street. But in many cases those grounds 
did not exist - the whole point of informal, preventive police work 
was to anticipate trouble, not to react to it. The gains to the police 
from these interventions were and are small, meaning that even a 
small risk of legal sanctions could generate a large amount of deter-
rence. So the police reacted to greater regulation by distancing 
themselves. The movement from foot patrols to cars, from preven-
tive to reactive policing, accelerated. The law created an incentive 
to wait until crimes happened, after which reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause would be easier to establish, rather than intervening 
to stop them. 
The story is of course more complicated than that; other vari-
ables were also at work.217 But if this account is even partly correct, 
it suggests that some forms of policing can work only if the law 
keeps its distance. Carefully regulating low-level seizures may well 
be inconsistent with a style of police work that many people are 
striving to recreate.21s 
Regulation may still be the right move. Community policing 
may be a bad idea. Still, this tension highlights something impor-
tant. A large category of reasonable exercises of police coercion -
"reasonable" in the sense that given full information, a large major-
ity of people across all major population groups would approve of 
215. See, e.g., HERMAN GoIDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED PouCINo 134 {1990); Douglas, 
supra note 169, at 12-13. 
216. It is no accident that the "stop-and-frisk" cases arose at the same time vagrancy and 
loitering laws were being struck down. See Stuntz, supra note 150, at 559-60. 
217. The two most obvious are rising crime rates and rising political concerns with appar· 
ent racism. The latter may have led still-largely-white police forces to scale back their street 
presence in black neighborhoods. 
218. See Moore, supra note 213, at 112-13 (noting the connection between reactive polic-
ing and the protection of individual privacy and liberty). 
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the police conduct - may not be cost-effective in a system of case-
by-case judicial scrutiny. The system may have to choose between 
foreclosing all such police conduct or permitting it at the cost of 
also permitting a good deal of misconduct, such as harassing citi-
zens because of their race. Racism combined with broad police dis-
cretion was, after all, what prompted courts to invalidate vagrancy 
and loitering laws in the first place. 
The current regime manages to suppress these issues, by focus-
ing attention on suspects' privacy interests and adopting a fictive 
view of consent that allows a good deal of informal coercion to take 
place. But this "solution" satisfies no one. Notwithstanding con-
sent search doctrine, the police lack the kind of informal authority 
that the old regime gave them - the kind of authority that may be 
essential to effective community policing. Meanwhile, the system 
does not come close to protecting the interests of people like Terry 
or Jimeno in being free from police coercion. 
Focusing squarely on coercion would force the system to face 
these trade-offs. Regulating street encounters between the police 
and the citizenry remains an incredibly hard job. The law of consti-
tutional criminal procedure may be able to do that job only very 
partially. It may be that most of the regulatory work must be done 
by police chiefs and citizen review boards, by people and institu-
tions operating outside the realm of constitutional law. But consti-
tutional law can surely do more and better than it does now, if 
courts focused on the right interest instead of paying so much atten-
tion to the wrong one. If unreasonable police use of force is the 
most important problem for the law of criminal investigation to 
solve, the fact that all solutions are partial and flawed is not reason 
enough to abandon the enterprise. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A generation after Mapp v. Ohio,219 we have a large and de-
tailed body of law to tell police when they may open paper bags or 
the trunks of cars. Meanwhile, the law speaks softly (or not at all) 
when it comes to the level of force that may be used in making an 
arrest or conducting a search. This structure is backward. Drawing 
lessons from isolated cases is risky, but the Rodney King incident 
may be symptomatic of the real problem of police misconduct. The 
problem is not information gathering but violence.220 Notwith-
219. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
220. For a wide-ranging discussion of that problem, see SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 
180. 
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standing our enormous body of Fourth Amendment law and the 
enormous volume of Fourth Amendment litigation, that problem 
has not generated much of a legal response. 
The law's relentless focus on privacy as secrecy has produced 
this state of affairs, because privacy protection has little to do with 
the worst aspects of police misconduct. And in a broader sense, 
privacy protection as the centerpiece of criminal procedure is reac-
tionary: it harks back to a constitutional order that placed severe 
limits on the size and regulatory power of the state, limits that have 
long since been discarded. 
This doctrinal wrong turn may be the product of historical acci-
dent. The Supreme Court's decision to intervene heavily in crimi-
nal procedure was coupled with the decision to incorporate the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause. At the time, Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ment law was strongly linked to privacy protection, a product of 
Boyd-era cases. Yet that privacy protection had already been 
cabined and undermined in order to avoid running afoul of the 
emerging regulatory state. The incorporation cases of the 1960s 
thus imported privacy's problem into the day-to-day law of criminal 
procedure, the law that governs ordinary car stops and arrests.221 
We have been wrestling with the problem ever since. The result is a 
system that does not consistently protect privacy because it cannot, 
and hardly protects other interests at all. Criminal procedure needs 
reorienting. 
221. This account is discussed in some detail in Stuntz, supra note 105. 
